Chapter One - The first Remedy pursued in November 1993

Bribery and Corruption have many evil faces and ‘grey’ areas within Australia’s politically-corrupt government. Criminal wrongdoings interact with the private sector: the revolving door of deception fits this page well.

Checkout out our Bribery and Corruption Part 1 and Part 2 pages. Both pages expose deception, fraud, and maleficent conduct within the Australian government. This deception must be extinguished 

The first remedy taken is to have my Telstra and Ericsson related claims assessed was facilitated by AUSTEL the then government communications regulator in November 1993, which then led to those matters being arbitrated between April 1994 and May 1995.

As we have stated in our Prologue page and in our Authors Note in a Preface page it is important we use the Ericsson link as part of my ongoing attempt to have the Australian government impartially investigate my claims against Telstra and whether Ericsson should have been allowed to purchase Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd during the period of the COT arbitrations.

How could a comprehensive log of my arbitration claim documents: i.e.; namely my claims of incorrect charging by Telstra of my telephone and faxing service along with some 3,000 or more collated documentation showing Telstra knowingly used faulty Ericsson telecommunication equipment which other countries around the world had removed from service once they had uncovered the many deficiencies in that equipment.

A letter from the Arbitration Project Manager on 18 April 1995, advised the TIO, the arbitrator and the TIO counsel that:

“It is unfortunate that there have been forces at work collectively beyond our reasonable control that have delayed us in undertaking our work.”

. . . .

“Any technical report prepared in draft by lanes [the Australian technical consultants that the COT Cases mistrusted] will be signed off and appear on the letterhead of (See Absent Justice - Arbitrator File No/17)

As discussed in the Authors Note on our Introduction Page, NONE of the four COT claimants were ever told about these “forces at work” nor were we warned that, under the noses of the TIO, his legal advisor and the arbitrator, these unnamed forces were allowed to infiltrate and manipulate the arbitration process. Three legal experts appeared to note nothing out of the ordinary or any illegalities, while the lives of the four COT cases were held to ransom by these STILL unnamed forces.

In this 18 April 1995, letter the Project Manager advised the TIO (see Absent Justice - Arbitrator File No/17) that the Director of the Canada technical consultancy firm was appointed by the TIO as the Principal technical consultant who was to take charge of the arbitration technical side of the operation arrived in Australia on 13 April 1995. He worked over the Easter Holiday period, particularly on the Smith claim where the Project Manger’s true colours were exposed when he noted:  “Any technical report prepared by draft by Lanes (the company who was soon to be purchased by Ericsson) will be signed off and appear on the letterhead of DMR Group Inc” [the Canadian technical consultancy the COT Cases trusted].

Here is clear proof, that even before the arbitrator brought his technical findings on 11 May 1995, the arbitration resource unit was prepared to mislead him into believing DMT Group Inc (in Canada) had prepared all of the technical findings on my claims when Lane had secretly assessed them without making a finding against Ericsson.

The Canadian firm received only three of my 22 submitted claim documents along with Telstra’s defence of my arbitration claim on 21 March 1995 (see Arbitrator File No/22). Telstra addressed no more than 11% of my claim documents. Their submitted response to my claim also supports this fact. And worst of all, none of the ongoing billing problems and my Ericsson data (the 3,000 or more documents) submitted in my comprehensive log of fault complaints were addressed.  

It is most important we attach here the following link http://www.wedophones.com/Manuals/EricssonNotInService/AXE%20Operation%20And%20Maint%20Module%201.pdf at this point of time because through this website, even though I asked the arbitrator to access the Portland AXE telephone exchange logbook, this logbook discussed on page 20 of this link was never accessed or provided to me under FOI or the arbitration discovery process. Even the Commonwealth Ombudsman tried to access this same logbook via writing to Telstra's CEO Frank Blount on 13 November 1994, asking why it was never provided to me under FOI. It is clear from page 20 in this attached link that all faults registered by Telstra's technicians concerning any ongoing telephone problems within the Portland and Cape Bridgewater switching exchange would have been entered into this logbook. 

This one document was all I needed to prove my claims of ongoing telephone problems was factual. Had the arbitrator been made aware of this, he could never have brought down his findings without making a provision in his award for further compensation until Telstra could prove there were no more problems with this AXE telephone exchange. The ambit of the Arbitration Act allowed for this provision for additional payment.

Just as important is, why did David Read from Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd (an ex-Telstra technician) advise the arbitrator of the importance of this Ericsson 77-page AXE manual? Is the reason Lane Telecommunications Pty Ltd did not inform the arbitrator that such a logbook existed because they were working with Ericsson from the very beginning when they were appointed by the TIO in March 1995 (eleven months after I signed my arbitration agreement? We are talking collusion here of the worse possible kind.  

The TIO-appointed financial resource unit Ferrier Hodgson Corporate Advisory (FHCA) advised this Canadian technical consultant on 5 April 1995 that the TIO-appointed Australian technical consultants would have his draft technical report prepared by 7 April 1995 (see Arbitrator File No/23).

The arbitrator’s draft award, on page three, states:

“…pursuant to paragraph 8 of the arbitration agreement, I had power to require a ‘Resource Unit,” comprising of FHCA, and DMR Group Australia Pty Ltd, to conduct such inquires or research as I saw fit;

On 21 February 1995, by the time I was satisfied that the submissions of all relevant material by both parties was complete, I instructed the Resource Unit FHCA (and, through them DMR) to conduct certain inquiries on my behalf’ (Exhibt AS 164 file AS-CAV 128 to 180).

The Arbitrators’ final award modifies these points so that they read:

“…pursuant to paragraph 8 of the arbitration agreement, I had power to require a ‘Resource Unit’ comprising FHCA Accountants, and DMR Group Australia Pty Ltd, to conduct such inquires or research as I saw fit. By consent of the parties, the role of DMR Group Australia Pty Ltd was subsequently performed jointly by the Canadian technical consultancy group and the Australian consultants;

“On 21 February 1995, by which time I was satisfied that the submissions of all relevant material by both parties was complete, I instructed the Resource Unit FHCA to conduct certain inquires on my behalf ” (Exhibit AS 165 file AS-CAV 128 to 180).

Summary of documents (AS-CAV Exhibit 128 to 180 - See AS-CAV 160 to AS CAV 165):

The technical findings in both the draft and final awards (except for the removal of the billing issues, which needed weeks to investigate) are mirror copies of each other. However, in the draft award, the writer states he called on the DMR Group Australia Pty Ltd to conduct inquiries by 21 February 1995. DMR Group Australia Pty Ltd resigned from the arbitration process months prior to this date. This Canadian consultancy firm and the TIO-appointed consultants were not officially appointed by the TIO until 9 March 1995 and/or officially accepted by letter of consent (see Arbitrator File No/24). The Canadian company did not receive any of the technical claim and defence material until 21 March 1995 (see Arbitrator File No/22).

Just as important is the question:

1. did the arbitrator know that David Reid from Lane actually assessed my claims documents before the independent Canadian consultant Paul Howell arrived in Australia?
2. did the arbitrator know that Ericsson was soon to purchase Lane and that this was the real reason Lane did not assess my comprehensive log of fault complaints which had clearly found against Erricson?

Who provided the arbitrator with the technical information he used in determining my award? Why did he only address anecdotal or historic phone problems, rather than the ongoing faults that were still affecting my business of the faulty Ericsson exchange equipment that Telstra had not removed from service as was the case in other countries who had used the same Erisccon equipment?

Two Conflicting Reports, Both Dated 30 April 1995

There are discrepancies between the arbitrator’s and my version of the technical consultants’ report titled Resource Unit Technical Evaluation Report. Mr Alan Smith. CBHC. 30 April 1995. The second paragraph on page one consists of only one short sentence “It is complete and final as it is,” (see (See Prologue/Chapter One). However, the second paragraph on the equivalent page (page two) of the arbitrator’s report, also dated 30 April 1993 says:

“There is, however, an addendum which we may find it necessary to add during the next few weeks on billing, i.e. possible discrepancies in Smith’s Telecom bills.” (See Prologue/Chapter One)

There is more information in the arbitrator’s version than there is in mine. The reference to my ongoing billing problems states extra weeks are required to complete the investigation. The arbitrator did NOT provide the extra weeks.

My page two of this report (see (See Prologue/Chapter One) shows no mention of my billing claim document in my version. However, page three in the arbitrator’s version notes:

“One issue in the Cape Bridgewater case remains open, and we shall attempt to resolve it in the next few weeks, namely Mr Smith’s complaints about billing problems.

“Otherwise, the Technician Report on Cape Bridgewater is complete.” (See Prologue/Chapter One)

How can two identical technical reports with the same 23 technical assessments, both dated 30 April 1995 and apparently both prepared by the same consultants, have one version noting that the “… case remains open, and we shall attempt to resolve it in the next few weeks”, while the other has no mention of it still being open and needing weeks to complete?

Both documents state: “A comprehensive log of Mr Smith’s complaints does not appear to exist.” It did exist, as we have shown. Had this comprehensive log of fault complaints been provided to the technical consultants to assess, they would have had to overrule the arbitrator’s decision not to allow them the extra weeks they had requested, in order to investigate my faulty Ericsson exchange documents as well as my ongoing billing fault claim material.

I did not receive the report until 2 May 1995, however, the arbitrator advised me I had five days in which to respond to the report

Open Letter File No/47-A to 47-D

Garry Ellicott and Barry O’Sullivan had definitely submitted a very comprehensive list of fault complaints as part of my submission (see Arbitrator File No/31 & 32). In the second week of June 1994, Garry Ellicott and Barry O’Sullivan freighted down eight bound, spiral reports from Queensland. One of those reports was a full chronology of events to assist with reading the comprehensive log of fault complaints. When I demanded an arbitration meeting to discuss these missing reports, my request was denied (see Arbitrator File No/48).

Could the loss of the comprehensive log of my fault complaints have anything to do with the arbitrator deciding not to proceed with my matters any further or to do with Lane in the process of being sold off to Ericsson?

Consider:

1. Why did the TIO-appointed arbitration technical unit state in their 30 April 1995 report that “A comprehensive log of Mr Smith’s complaints does not appear to exist” when my claim advisors Garry Ellicott and Barry O’Sullivan submitted a full chronology numbered as evident on pages 11, 12 and 22 in their reply to Telstra’s Interrogatories (see Arbitrator File No/91).
2. Why did the TIO arbitration resource unit advise the new TIO on 15 November 1995, six months after my arbitration was over, that the billing issues I raised were not addressed in arbitration because they were not submitted until April 1995 (see (See Prologue/Chapter One)? Yet, their correspondence to the arbitrator (and copied to the TIO on 2 August 1996) show these billing issues discussed by the resource unit in December 1994 (see Arbitrator File No/53).
3. Why did the research unit arbitration project manager, in this 15 November 1995 letter, also state: “As no further progress was likely to be made on these matters, the formal version of the Technical Evaluation Report did not leave the billing issues open.”? Yet this letter proves beyond all doubt these ongoing unaddressed billing faults were left “open”.

Canadian and Australian consultancy report 

The 23 findings included in the TIO-appointed technical consultants report draft report (inadvertently provided to me three months after the end of my arbitration) are exact duplicates of the findings in the final 30 April 1995 Canadian and Australian consultancy report provided to me by the arbitrator, but that so-called ‘final version’ had NOT been signed off.

Why did I have to wait until 16 August 1996, 15 months after the end of my arbitration, before I finally received a copy of a covering letter apparently provided by the Canadian consultancy firm to the arbitration project manager, on 30 April 1995, in relation to the final version of the 30 April 1995 draft report? And I only received that covering letter from the TIO who advised me that:

“…the Arbitrator was not obliged to forward a copy of this covering letter to you, as it did not, strictly speaking, form part of the Technical Evaluation Report. However, in the interest of alleviating your concerns, I now enclose a copy of Paul Howell’s [Canadian consultant]’s covering letter”. (See Arbitrator File No/25)

Neither the arbitrator, the TIO, nor the arbitration project manager has ever explained why the formal technical report supplied to the arbitrator and then copied to me was not signed off, or why the covering letter, allegedly written by this Canadian technical consultancy firm, was not produced until 15 months after my arbitration was declared. Unbeknown to the TIO, the Canadian consultant had already spoken directly to me, on 31 May 1995, (see my partner’s diary note, Arbitrator File No/26) advising that he didn’t sign off on the report because it was NOT FINISHED at the time it was submitted to the arbitrator, myself and Telstra for their official comments.

The following information, under the heading Important Comparisons, is just one example from a long list of crimes connected to my arbitration, and it is the combination of those criminal activities that have destroyed the last 20 years of my life and that of my partner.

Important Comparisons

The list of documents (see Arbitrator File No/22) the arbitration resource unit sent to Canada for assessment does NOT include a comprehensive log of my fault complaints, although it does include 10 volumes of Telstra’s defence documents to address the three bound volumes of my claim documents (instead of the 17 that should have been sent).

Arbitrator File No/31 & 32 also confirms that no comprehensive log of my fault complaints was assessed, either in Canada or in Australia. None of the numbered claim documents that Garry Ellicott and Barry O’Sullivan submitted were assessed either.

Arbitrator File No/31 & 32 is a list of claim documents numbered SM2, SM16, SM 17, SM20, SM21, SM45, SM46, SM47, SM48, SM49, SM50 and SM53. These documents are missing from the final technical report. This document illustrates Barry and Garry’s numbering system and shows that, on my behalf, they sent the arbitrator another seven folders that included documents numbered 1-200, 200-400, 400-600, 600-800, 800-1,000, 1,000-1289 and 2,001-2,158, i.e. a total of 2,158 documents, further to the other documents labelled as SM.

Prologue/Chapter One shows that both of these almost-identical reports are dated 30 April 1995. However, one was supposed to be a draft version and the other was supposed to be the final version. How can one include a list of 17 bound submissions, examined by the technical consultants, while the other lists only three; but both versions state that the same 4,000 documents were examined? These reports indicate that every single one of the extra 3,000 documents was apparently assessed on 30 April 1995, the day that both the reports were dated, which is clearly not even remotely possible.

An Exercise in Logic

If one version of the report shows that there are 14 sets of claim documents (3,000 more documents to be assessed as well as the other version) apparently produced on the same day, and notes that those documents were properly assessed, how could the resource consultants have assessed 3,000 extra technical documents in the space of one single day?

As an exercise in logic, let us assume consultants from the Canadian and Australian consultancies were able to assess, collate and understand the relevance of those 3,000 technical documents in the one day available. Where are the results of that phenomenal assessment? There are no references to assessments of the billing documents in the so-called ‘final’ version of the report and/or draft report. The only reference to billing issues in the arbitrator’s version indicates the need for extra weeks to assess my billing claim documents – making it blatantly obvious that the Canadian and Australian consultants were not able to magically assess, collate and understand the relevance of those 3,000 billing and faulty Ericsson claim documents at all.

Obviously, it is not humanly possible to read all 3,000 documents even briefly, let alone check complex calculations too.

The submission of this technical report, still incomplete, is deception on a very wide scale, involving some very prominent Australian identities, all of whom should have known better than to go along with this level of deceit in the first place, let alone remain involved in this deception for another 20 or more years. I first raised these two conflicting technical report issues with the TIO in August 1995, when the arbitrator’s secretary inadvertently provided them to me.

There is no mention, in any correspondence provided to the Canadian or Australian consultants, of Telstra’s threats or the carrying out those threats by not providing me with the FOI documents I requested because I assisted the AFP’s investigation into Telstra’s unauthorised interception of my telephone conversations. This decision seriously disadvantaged the whole preparation of my arbitration claim.

Why didn’t the arbitrator and TIO initiate an investigation into how an Australian citizen (me) could be so disadvantaged during a civil arbitration process, simply for carrying out his civil duty; assisting the AFP with their investigations into Telstra’s unauthorised interception of my telephone conversations?

The truth of what was done to me by the arbitrator and technical consultants is firmly embedded in these two conflicting reports. All that is needed is for one government official to start asking questions upon reading absentjustice.com so the truth surrounding these two conflicting reports will finally be revealed.

None of the important Ericsson and billing claim documents in those aforementioned 14 folders (see above) was assessed or defended by Telstra in Australia, or assessed by DMR Inc. in Canada. It is also important to note that I provided the government officials conducting those three separate investigations documentation confirming that NONE of my Ericsson and billing fault claim material was ever assessed under the agreed (arbitration agreement).

The Deception Continues

Before reading the following Ericsson segment below, please consider: is Telstra, via the government, protecting the international telecommunication company Ericsson at the expense of the COT cases? We exposed, during our government-endorsed arbitrations, that Telstra was knowingly using faulty equipment in its exchanges to the detriment of Australian business operators, who were losing millions of dollars from lost revenue due to incoming business calls not reaching their businesses (see Misleading Deceptive Conduct File No 4-D and 4-E).

The then government-owned Telstra knowingly continued to use Ericsson equipment in its Australian telephone exchanges during the COT arbitrations, despite British Telecom and other telecommunication companies in Europe recalling that same equipment. When evidence of this was provided to Senator Alston in September 1995 (after my arbitration finished without my telephone faults being fixed), he exploded: how dare Telstra treat the parliament and its citizens with such contempt. Senator Alston had first raised this equipment issue on my behalf on 25 February 1994 in the Senate. With this new evidence on hand, Senator Alston, in front of the Hon David Hawker MP (my then Federal Member of Parliament) and numerous other witnesses, asked me to continue assisting his office to bring this faulty Ericsson equipment issue to the attention of the government.

In 1994 and 1995, George Close and Associates (the official COT cases’ arbitration technical consultants) alerted the arbitrator Dr Gordon Hughes that Telstra’s arbitration defence engineers were also using known-faulty Ericsson telephone-testing equipment, even though Senator Alston and others were advised it was not compatible with rural unmanned roadside switching exchanges, like the Cape Bridgewater RCM telephone system my business was connected to. So, further to the exchange equipment being defective, the Ericsson telephone-testing equipment, used by Telstra during the arbitrations, was also faulty.

It is clear, from the various exhibits on Absentjustice.com, that numerous governments over the past 25 years have ignored most of the COT Cases, as An injustice to the remaining 16 Australian citizens shows, in order to protect Ericsson, a multinational telecommunications company whose faulty testing equipment the then government-owned Telstra corporation used in its arbitration defence against the COT cases.

One of the many interesting questions so far unanswered relates to 2 February 1995, during the COT arbitrations, when the government communications regulator (AUSTEL), formally and deliberately misinformed the Hon Michael Lee MP by telling him that all the tests carried out until then in relation to the first six of the COT arbitrations, had met all of the required government standards even though, ten weeks earlier, on 15 December 1994, AUSTEL had already been formally warned by a prominent, independent, technical expert stating the testing information (which had been collected from the Ericsson SVT testing process) should NOT have been used in the COT arbitrations (see pages 10 and 13 of the Michael Rumsewicz PhD report provided to the government communications regulator that:

“Telecom Australia, as part of document G.001, applies a standard technique based on hypothesis testing. Hypothesis testing is used to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to reject one hypothesis (known as null hypothesis) in favour of another (known as the alternative hypothesis). If insufficient evidence exists to reject the null hypothesis, the null hypothesis is accepted. It is critical to note this is not the same as saying that the null hypothesis has been verified.”

…and on page 13 he reports:

“We believe that, given the stated purpose of the Service Verification Tests supplied in the Telecom Australia Customer Fault Management Procedures document (000 841) and that of the AUSTEL COT cases report, the statistical test being applied to the collected data is inappropriate. We believe the alternative test described above is more suitable and, in addition, promotes customer confidence in the test procedure and analysis. …

“We believe that the analysis of collected data should be expanded to include an examination of call failures broken down by originating exchange, time of day and type of failure. In the event that correlations in the failures are found, further investigations, as appropriate, should be undertaken.”

In my own case, the government was also informed that Telstra’s arbitration defence received advice from AUSTEL, on 11 October and 16 November 1994, that the Service Verification Tests (SVT) conducted at my business was grossly deficient. AUSTEL demanded Telstra advise what it intended doing about this deficiency see Front Page Part One File/No 24-A to 24-B

The failed SVT tests had been generated (trunked) through the same faulty Ericsson testing equipment using the PTARS 055 267211 service line.

I reiterate, No retesting of my business ever took place after Telstra was warned of their SVT deficiencies.

Collusion between AUSTEL and Telstra (who after all were the defendants in my arbitration) continued throughout this process i.e., particularly Absent Justice Part 3/Chapter Thirteen and Fourteen).

During the 1997 and 1999 Senate FOI investigations, the five litmus COT cases who had their FOI document issues assessed by the Senate received enough Ericsson fault documentation to enable them to secure a reasonable compensation payout. In April 1999, the Minister for Communications Senator Richard Alston, his Chief of Staff the Hon Paul Fletcher and others halted the investigation and the faulty Ericsson equipment documentation was withheld from the remaining 16 COT cases, who were still waiting for these details to prove their telephone and exchange problems were ongoing issues affecting their businesses.

Both the NEAT testing equipment used by Telstra and BCI at the Cape Bridgewater unmanned RCM switching station parented off of the Portland AXE Ericsson telephone exchange between the 4 and 9 November 1993 and on the 29 September 1994 the day Telstra tried to run their arbitration Service Tess (SVT tests) but had to abandon the process was Ericsson made equipment. This Ericsson NEAT testing equipment was also not compatible when the covert phone interception equipment that the Australian Federal Police investigations found had been connected to my service lines over an extended period.

There are further issues surrounding the TIO’s answers to similar Questions on Notice asked by the Senate committee. The TIO’s official response confirms that Ericsson purchased the arbitration main technical consultancy firm, Lane Telecommunications, during the COT arbitrations. All the technical information that I supplied to Lane Telecommunications during my arbitration, confirming the AXE Portland and Cape Bridgewater lockup problems were not just a local problem but a national and international problem, affecting hundreds of exchanges all over the world, was acquired by Ericsson.

At least three other COT claimants also had businesses connected to Ericsson AXE exchanges and their claim material, too, was on Lane’s computer data files when the company was sold.

Australia must be the only country in the Western world that allows a witness (Lane Telecommunications was a witness to what the COT claimants had uncovered) to be purchased during a major litigation process, particularly when even the administrator advised the Senate committee of this, on 26 September 1997 (see Senate Evidence File No/61).

I believe the Australian government should answer the following questions: How long was Lane Telecommunications in contact with Ericsson, the major supplier of telecommunication equipment to Telstra, before Ericsson purchased Lanes? Is there a link between Lanes ignoring my Ericsson AXE claim documents and the purchase of Lanes by Ericsson during the COT arbitration process?

To have been literally forced into 12 separate investigations over two decades, because I sought a reliable phone service in order to operate my telephone-dependent business, has been soul searching, to say the least. Telstra used outside lawyers as well as in-house lawyers during the arbitration process to convince the arbitrator that the very problems he was investigating were only historic complaints, rather than the ongoing complaints first registered with Telstra six-plus years previously. This is unconscionable conduct of the worse possible kind. Telstra was still unable to fix these problems eight years later when the arbitration drew to a close – and yet the official government April 1994 AUSTEL COT Cases report arbitration agreement states that findings could not be brought down until Telstra’s Service Verification Testing of the COT Cases businesses had shown they were not experiencing any further network problems.

Worse, Telstra and its lawyers only achieved this result, because, as our story shows, the government communications regulator (then AUSTEL, now ACMA) allowed Telstra to address some of the most relevant arbitration claim documents in secret, without me or the arbitrator’s knowledge. This despicable act not only prevented the arbitrator from realising how bad these ongoing telephone problems were, but also disallowed me my legal right of reply under the arbitration agreement (rules). The government regulator also allowed Telstra’s submission of arbitration witness statements prepared by at least one Portland Telstra technician, despite my claim advisor (an ex-detective sergeant of police) proving to the arbitrator, during arbitration, that this particular witness statement was more than just fundamentally flawed: the author had perjured himself on at least two accounts. This is clearly criminal misconduct. And, yet, the government allowed this same witness statement to be used secretly in a process that should never have been allowed without the arbitrator and me present.

Mr Davey concurs, “It was less accurate than it should have been.”

And, as we now know, even Mr Davey’s statement that Telecom’s “exchanges had been given a clean bill of health”was incorrect as the BCI test calls were trunked through the Warrnambool exchange and not the Cape Bridgewater RCM exchange.

How many other BCI tests conducted at various other exchanges around Australia were fabricated in a similar manner to those shown in the BCI Cape Bridgewater report?

Even though arbitration documentation shows both I, advised the arbitrator that I was still registering complaints of ongoing phone and facsimile problems throughout my arbitration, he brought down his findings in favour of Telstra BCI addressing only old anecdotal phone faults that were affecting my business prior to the BCI report which the Ericsson fault ridden testing equipment had falsely given my business the green light.

The further confirms this fact, it is noted in the arbitrator official 11 may 1995 award at point 3.5 that:

“Telecom commissioned Bell Canada International (“BCI”) to audit its testing a fault finding capabilities as a result of problems reported by a number of commercial telephone customers, including the COT Cases. Telecom noted at the time that it had been unable to find a widespread network problem or individual problems which could account for the nature and extent of these reported faults.”

“In summarising its findings, BCI concluded that the tests  revealed a grade of service being delivered by Telecom to its customers which met global network performance standards. There was no evidence of any network dysfunction that could create the variety and magnitude of troubles reported by the COT Cases.”  

This seems to indicate that before Telstra submitted the Cape Bridgewater BCI report to arbitration they already knew that it was fabricated and they also knew it would put an end to any chance of a proper investigation into my claims of ongoing telephone problems, even though those problems and faults continued to ruin my business throughout the entire time that it took for my arbitration process to be completed and, as absentjustice.com shows, these unaddressed and ongoing telephone problems also continued for many years after the arbitrator accepted the falsified BCI report into evidence.

As discussed on our Absentjustice.com – Preface page the following six individual Senators all made official statements dated 6 March 1999 (See > Eggleston, Sen Alan – Bishop, Sen Mark – Boswell, Sen Ronald – Carr, Sen Kim – Schacht, Sen Chris, Alston and Sen Richard) which all formally record how those six senators believed that Telstra had ‘acted as a law unto themselves’ throughout all of the COT arbitrations. It is clear from Senator Ron Boswells statement that:

“…Telstra are still withholding the most important network documents. Mr Wynack [Commonwealth Ombudsman Office] has said, `There is plausible evidence that Ericsson would have documentation’ and that he believes much of the documentation specified by Mrs Garms would have been created. Further, going to the core of the dispute of bad service,” 

Senator Boswell believed along with John Wynack that Telstra was still concealing vital Ericsson exchange equipment from the COT cases.

This is the same Ericsson and Telstra logbook material that John Wynack Commonwealth Ombudsman Office had also tried to access from Telstra on my behalf between January 1994 and October 1997.

The Portland/Cape Bridgewater exchange logbook was concealed from me during my arbitration. It was not even provided to the arbitration process under confidentiality when I asked the arbitrator to access it under discovery and it was also not provided after Commonwealth Ombudsman director of investigations John Wynack demanded to know why it had not been supplied under FOI, in his 13 November 1994 letter to Telstra’s CEO Frank Blount. This shows Telstra concealed vital evidence during my arbitration. Had this document been provided, it would have proved my phone problems were still ongoing and it would have shown that the Ericsson telecommunications testing equipment being used by Telstra was grossly deficient.

AUSTEL and Ericsson themselve acknowledges that Ericsson AXE telephone exchange lockup problems could have a call loss from 15% to 50% (see  Home-Page File No/64), Evidence File No/10-A to 10-f

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