PLEASE NOTE: Australian Federal Police Investigations was created on 6 May 2017 and is a work in progress. Last edited March 2021.
Privacy issues not addressed
On 3 June 1990, during the period Telstra was telling me they had not found any problems (faults in their network) that were still affecting the viability of my businesses, The Australian (newspaper) on printed an article under the heading: Telecom ‘spying’ on its employees, which supports pages 1 to 6 of the AFP transcripts (see Senate Evidence File No/ 44 Part 1 and File No/45 Part). The newspaper article states:
“She said the accusations were contained in a statement by a former member of Telecom’s Protective Services branch.
“Senator Jenkins said the man claimed:
- He and other Telecom employees and private investigators hired by Telecom did secret surveillance on hundreds of compensation recipients. …
- He had been directed by his superior to use whatever methods to get the desired results, even when it was obvious the claimant was genuinely injured.
- Claimants have had a ‘C.CASS run’ on their homes, which is a procedure where a computer can print out all numbers dialled on a home phone.” (See Hacking-Julian Assange File No/19)
Democrat Senator Jean Jenkins told the Senate last week Telecom’s activities included bugging workers’ homes. …
In February 1994, the AFP visited my business at Cape Bridgewater to discuss my claims that recently received FOI documents suggested Telstra had been monitoring my telephone conversations. The AFP was concerned that Telstra had written the names of various people and businesses I had called, on CCAS data records, which collated all incoming and outgoing calls to my business (see Hacking-Julian Assange File No 20). The hand-written notes in the right-hand column of this CCAS data include against dates, the names of people that I telephoned and/or faxed e.g., 31 January 1994, GM (Golden Messenger), AUSTEL and the Ombudsman. In one instance, the name Faye Smith appears when I phoned my ex-wife. This reflects Senator Jenkins statements above regarding Telstra’s secret surveillance of their own employees in 1990, because here is Telstra using similar tactics in January 1994 while they were in a litigation process with me.
The pressure on all four of us COT cases was immense, with TV and newspaper interviews as well as our continuing canvassing of the Senate. The stress was telling by now but I continued to hammer for a change in rural telephone services. The other three COT Cases businesses were in central Brisbane and Melbourne. The Hon David Hawker MP, my local Federal member of parliament, had been corresponding with me for some time concerned that people in his electorate were being treated as second-class citizens. On 26 July 1993, Mr Hawker wrote:
“A number of people seem to be experiencing some or all of the problems which you have outlined to me. …
“I trust that your meeting tomorrow with Senators Alston and Boswell is a profitable one.”(See Arbitrator File No/76)
On 18 August 1993 The Hon David Hawker again wrote to me, noting:
“Further to your conversations with my electorate staff last week and today I am enclosing a copy of the correspondence I have received from Mr Harvey Parker, Group Managing Director of Commercial and Consumer division of Telecom.
“I wrote to him outlining the problems of a number of Telecom customers in the Western Districts, including the extensive problems you have been experiencing.” (See Arbitrator File No/77 and Arbitrator File No/82)
A 12 August 1993 letter (see AFP Evidence File No 8) from a singles club client to me, describes the constant engaged signal she experienced when trying to book a weekend during April and May 1993. A Telstra FOI document (see AFP Evidence File No 8) dated 17 June 1993, refers to the same to ladies whose names. Not only does this document record the personal phone numbers of these two ladies, but it also confirms Telstra was fully aware of when my office assistant left the business while I was away.
My AFP interview transcript on 26 September 1994 describes Telstra recording who I phoned or faxed, and when. The AFP believed Telstra monitored my calls because the people they recorded were associated with the COT issues. Pages 3-5 of the AFP transcript, together with other documents I provided to the AFP between February and November 1994, prove that Telstra had listened in on private conversations prior to and during my government-endorsed arbitration process.
So chronic and serious were my telephone faults in early 1993, that Telstra threatened (the first of two series of threats) that I had to register my ongoing telephone/faxing problems with their outside lawyers or they would refuse to regard my complaints as genuine.
By July/August 1993, the communications regulator was becoming concerned at Telstra’s approach to our complaints; particularly their continual use of outside solicitors. In October 1993, while the regulator was negotiating with Telstra for a commercial settlement proposal to be put in place for the COT members, the regulator’s chairman made it clear to Telstra’s commercial division that the regulator would not be happy if Telstra’s solicitors were used in future COT matters. This request was ignored however and Telstra continued to insist that I register my complaints through their solicitors until 28 January 1994.
Later, when Telstra submitted their defence of my arbitration, I learned that Telstra’s solicitors also acted as Telstra’s defence counsel. By this time, I was able to provide the arbitrator with clear proof that Telstra had provided incorrect written statements to the regulator and me, with regard to incidents that occurred between January and August of 1993. The arbitrator would not investigate this information.
One document I provided the AFP in 1994, does not state Adelaide or a specific location elsewhere, other than I was visiting Melbourne. I used to visit both Melbourne and South Australia on a regular basis from 1991 to 1993. Did Telstra even know where I stayed and who with? Let us not forget, I was not under suspicion of committing any crime let alone a serious one, nor was I suspected of being a terrorist. So why were the communications carrier and/or their government minders interested in my contacts and movements? When I showed see AFP Evidence File No 8 to Margaret (my office assistant) she advised me that she had not spoken to anyone about leaving the holiday camp (which was at 5.30 pm just as described in this Telstra memo). This part of our Hacking-Julian Assange page more than suggests that my daily moments were monitored by someone and/or some organisation who had ready access to Telstra’s network.
After the AFP had discussed that Telstra file note with me it became clear that Telstra knew that I was getting regular phone calls from someone in Adelaide who usually rang from his Pizza Restaurant but, on this occasion, they had noted that he had phoned me from a different number. AFP transcripts indicate their concern that, in order to have gained this knowledge, Telstra must have been listening to ALL my telephone conversations, both on a regular basis and for some considerable time. I alerted AUSTEL to this situation because some documents, which I have retained, record some eighty or more calls that should have connected to my business but didn’t, because they were illegally diverted to another number. At that time, this is exactly what was happening to other businesses around Australia too, and AUSTEL and the AFP could both see that all those calls were being diverted to the same business.
Please note: for security reasons I have blackened out the names and phone number as shown on AFP Evidence File No 8. The AFP have copies of the clear file notes.
29 October 1993: Graham Schorer of Golden Messenger Courier Service and I were still having problems sending faxes between our respective offices. This Telstra internal FOI document K01489, confirms that while Telstra was testing my Mitsubishi fax machine (using the office of Golden Messenger as the testing base which notes:
‘During testing the Mitsubishi fax machine some alarming patterns of behaviour was noted”. This document further goes on to state: “…Even on calls that were tampered with the fax machine displayed signs of locking up and behaving in a manner not in accordance with the relevant CCITT Group fax rules. Even if the page was sent upside down the time and date and company name should have still appeared on the top of the page, it wasn’t’
During a received call the machine failed to respond at the end of the page even though it had received the entire page (sample #3) The Mitsubishi fax machine remained in the locked up state for a further 2 minutes after the call had terminated, eventually advancing the page out of the machine. (See AFP Evidence File No 9)
Many of those within the Establishment said that it was actually unconstitutional to force the COT cases into an arbitration process with Telstra while the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were still investigating Telstra for alleged phone and fax hacking of the COT cases’ businesses and, furthermore, it was acknowledged that it was clearly an unworkable process. This didn’t stop the arbitrations, however, but it does raise a number of important questions:
- How could two separate investigations into Telstra, for allegedly unlawful conduct, be undertaken by two different organisations at the same time i.e an arbitrator as well as the AFP? As far as we can find, this situation is unheard of in any other Western democracy.
- While all the COT cases attempted to keep their individual small businesses going while their arbitrations continued, how could they be expected to submit a complex submission to an arbitrator and at the same time, assist the AFP with their investigations?
- Who decided that this situation would be allowed to continue?
Not only was it grossly undemocratic for these small-business people to be put into such a situation but, while these two investigations (the one run by the AFP and the arbitrations themselves) were being run concurrently. While these two investigations were being run concurrently, the Commonwealth Ombudsman was also investigating Telstra for acting unlawfully and outside of the Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act, 1984), for NOT supplying the COT cases with our promised FOI documents we needed to support our claims. That investigation started before the COTs signed their arbitrations and continued for the whole five-year period
How have many other Australian arbitration processes been subjected to this type of hacking? Is this electronic eaves-dropping, this hacking into in-confidence documentation still happening today, during legitimate Australian arbitration’s?
QUESTIONS ON NOTICE: On 15 February 1994, during my settlement /arbitration process, Senator Richard Alston (Shadow Minister for Communications) put a number of questions to the Senate Estimates Committee, On Notice, to be answered by Telstra. These are the questions most pertinent to the COT claimants (see Main Evidence File No/29 QUESTIONS ON NOTICE):
- Could you guarantee that no Parliamentarians who have had dealings with ‘COT’ members have had their phone conversations bugged or taped by Telstra?
- Who authorised this taping of ‘COT’ members’ phone conversations and how many and which Telstra employees were involved in either making the voice recordings, transcribing the recordings or analysing the tapes?
- On what basis is Telstra denying copies of tapes to those customers which it has admitted to taping?
- (A) How many customers has Telstra recorded as having had their phone conversations taped without knowledge or consent since 1990? (B) Of these, how many were customers who had compensation claims, including ex Telecom employees, against Telecom?
- Why did Telecom breach its own privacy guide-lines and how will it ensure that the revised guidelines will not be open to similar breaches or abuses?
- Could you explain why a large amount of documents accessed by customers under FOI have a large amount of information deleted, including the names of Telecom employees who wrote and received memos and documents?
- How many customers who have alleged that Telecom has tapped or bugged their phones without their consent or knowledge are the Australian Federal Police currently investigating?
The response to Question 5 (see Main Evidence File No/29) notes “…These matters are currently being investigated by the AFP and AUSTEL, and by Telecom;
It would be inappropriate for Telecom to make any further comments at this stage about possible breaches of the Telecommunications (Interception) Act while the matter is before the Federal Police. However, the Minister will be making a full statement in the near future on action taken to date to remedy apparent procedural problems within Telecom”.
Telstra’s claim (when referring to Question 5 On Notice) that it would be inappropriate for them to comment on these phone interception issues whilst the AFP were still investigating these matters is, in itself, the normal and expected comment that Telstra lawyers would have ensured that Telstra would make, under those circumstances. No other form of interception investigation by any other authority should have taken place whilst the AFP were still investigating these breaches of privacy issues because that might well have undermined the AFP process.
Before I signed for my arbitration, on 21 April 1994, I used a similar response to questions from the Telecommunication Industry Ombudsman (the administrator of the arbitrations) when I advised the TIO that it would be unworkable for the Arbitrator to start my arbitration while the AFP had not yet concluded their investigation, particularly since the COT spokesperson and I were both seeking compensation from Telstra as part of our arbitration claims and in direct relation to Telstra’s breaches of the Interception Act. I still clearly remember, as if it was yesterday, that the TIO stated that he would tactfully carry out his own investigations, along with the Arbitrator, and that their investigation would not impede the then-present AFP investigations. As shown in our Front Page Part One, the arbitrator then allowed Telstra to cross-examine me regarding what the AFP had uncovered during my arbitration.
Telstra’s statement to the Senate Estimates Committee (at point 5) that: “It would be inappropriate for Telecom to make any further comments at this stage about possible breaches of the Telecommunications (Interception) Act while the matter is before the Federal Police”, clearly raises the question of why the COT Cases were forced into arbitration while the AFP were still investigating exactly the same breaches of privacy claims that were to also be investigated by the arbitrator because how can there be two investigations, by two separate bodies, into the same complaints, at the same time? What if the AFP and the arbitrator came up with conflicting findings? Which findings would the arbitrator then use to calculate and pay compensation?
Of course, it was an unworkable arbitration process while the AFP was involved.
What finally happened is that neither the AFP nor the arbitrator produced a record of any findings in relation to the (now proven) invasion of my privacy and it is now twenty-two years later, after no decision was made by either side, and it is the COT Cases who have been left to live with these undecided issues, regardless of the fact that it cost each of us hundreds of thousands of dollars just to take part in this arbitration facade.
January 1994: A Telstra arbitration liaison officer faxed this document to the TIO in relation to the appointment of an assessor for the Fast Track Settlement Proposal. The words across the top of this document, in the space that should record the sender’s business identification are absent, and it records only the wording “Fax from” then followed by the fax number. The Scandrett & Associates Pty Ltd report discusses this “Fax from” issue (see Open Letter File No/12, and File No/13). The fact that a secondary fax machine installed in Telstra’s network during the arbitration process intercepted this document (see Hacking-Julian Assange File No 26) is another reason why this illegal interception of legal in-confidence documents should have been investigated during our arbitrations, when these illegal acts were first discovered. Who were the faceless people who were soon termed the “forces at work”?
My Fast Track Settlement Proposal (FTSP) Accountant Selwyn Cohen sent me a fax on 21 January 1994 stating:
“I refer to your facsimile of 10.42am on 17th January 1994. The fax cover sheet refers to 7 pages being sent. Unfortunately, I only received 2 pages. Please forward the remaining 5 pages to enable me to begin the required work.” (See AFP Evidence File No 2-A to 2-C)
This was the forth time between the Christmas period of 1993, that Mr Cohen had problems sending or receiving documents from me.
31 January 1994: A copy of Alan’s phone/fax account 055 267230, when compared with these two Telstra CCAS document FOI number K01410 and K01411 confirm someone within Telstra has hand-written the names of the people I had spoken to and/or faxed. (see AFP Evidence File No/3)
Transcripts from my interview with the AFP 26th September 1994 (see Australian Federal Police Investigation File No/1), confirm that the AFP were alarmed that Telstra had gathered private information about me including documenting on this CCAS data the names of the people who I had telephoned on a daily basis. This CCAS data information was supplied to Warwick Smith, and the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s office.
Stedman Cameron, Lawyers & Solicitors wrote to me on 2 February 1994, stating:
“We note that you did not receive two pages at all and only the number 2 from the third page and the signature from the last page of the facsimile sent to you at approximately 2.23pm on the 1st February, 1994. It was successfully sent approximately two hours later.” (AFP Evidence File No 2-A to 2-C)
Telstra’s FOI document (M34363) dated 4 February 1994 was not made available to the arbitrator or me during my arbitration, even though Telstra’s FOI numbering system (M followed by a number) clearly indicates to Telstra and the TIO’s office that I was still reporting problems with my fax transmissions during my FTSP process (see Hacking-Julian Assange File No 24).
“I am writing to inform you that members of the group known as the Casualties of Telecom (COT) have contacted my Office regarding the Australian Federal Police enquiries into voice monitoring by Telstra of their telephones. Both Mr Graham Schorer and Mr Alan Smith of COT have informed my Office that they have information on Telstra’s activities in relation to these matters.” (This exhibit is held in government archives)
8 February 1994, The Hon Michael Lee Minister for Communications writes to the Minister for Justice, the Hon Duncan Kerr, MP: (note: this document is held in Government archives.)
“I am writing to inform you that members of the group known as the Casualties of Telecom (COT) have contacted my Office regarding the Australian Federal Police inquires into voice monitoring by Telstra of their telephones.
Both Mr Graham Schorer and Mr Alan Smith of COT have informed my Office that they have information on Telstra’s activities in relation to these matters”.
‘Specification for Customer Premises Line Monitoring Equipment. 1.0 noting:
“The original direction from AUSTEL in relation to Difficult Fault cases required the installation of equipment to monitor a customer’s line at the customer’s premises as well as the exchange end. The equipment currently in operation in Telecom has some deficiencies in meeting this requirement. The Coopers & Lybrand Report recommended the development or purchase of such equipment. These recommendations are a fundamental foundation for a joint working party between AUSTEL and Telecom to develop the specifications for such equipment. The specifications should be finalised by December 1994”.
On 25 February 1994: When this letter to Telstra’s Corporate Secretary from Fay Holthuyzen, Assistant to the Minister for Communications, Michael Lee, (AS 772-a) is compared to the letter dated 3rd February 1994 Exhibit (AS 772-b) that I sent to the Minister’s office it is clear that I was concerned that my faxes were being illegally intercepted.
On the same day of 25 February 1994, an internal Government Memo confirms that the then-Minister for Communications and the Arts had written to me to advise that the Australian Federal Police (AFP) would investigate my allegations of illegal phone/fax interception. (AS 773)
On 3 March 1994: this article appeared in the Portland Observer newspaper (AS 773-b) noting:
“Federal Police officers are investigating allegations of possible illegal activity on the part of Telecom Australia.
Officers from the Federal Police visited Portland last week and interviewed Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp proprietor, Alan Smith, who is one of the four original members of COT (Casualties of Telecom).”
Leading up to the signing of the Arbitration Agreement, 21 April 1994, and before the final COT report was provided to the Communications Minister on 13 April 1994, I and various other COT Cases attended a two-day, lock-up, confidential viewing of the draft COT Cases report at AUSTEL’s headquarters in Queens Road, Melbourne. At this meeting Robin Davey, AUSTEL’s Chairman, reminded Graham Schorer, COT Spokesperson, and me of commitments made in a letter dated 23 September 1992, from Telecom’s Commercial Consumer Group Managing Director to Graham, (see at point 5.7 AUSTEL COT Case Report, which stated:
“As I explained at our meeting, we cannot move to settlement discussions or arbitration while we are unable to identify faults which are affecting these services.”
At the time of the AUSTEL lockup meeting, Graham and I refused to change from the commercial Fast Track Settlement Proposal (FTSP) to arbitration. It was then that Robin Davey noted that the original agreement to properly identify the phone and fax faults still stood because an assessor (or arbitrator) would not be able to hand down findings if the problems and faults had not been rigorously tested. At this lock-up meeting, I was alerted by Robin Davey to various sections of the AUSTEL report where AUSTEL clarified that Service Verification Testing would be conducted on Difficult Network Fault (DNF) customers, which is how the COT claimants had been classified.
It was also discussed at this meeting, in the company of Graham Schorer, Ann Garms, Maureen Gillan, Graham and me, by Robin Davey, that because our phone and fax interception claims were now in the hands of the AFP, our interception complaints were confidential and MUST not be discussed in the public domain.
At this meeting, which was attended by Ann Garms, Maureen Gillan, Graham and me, Robin Davey also raised the important issue of how, because our phone and fax interception claims were now in the hands of the AFP, those claims were therefore confidential and so MUST NOT be discussed in the public domain.
Back before this meeting, the AFP had told us that we were obliged to supply them with all of the Telstra FOI documents that we had received, and which suggested that any of our telephone conversations and faxes to/from the AFP might have been intercepted, explaining that this was because this whole matter was now ‘before the Government’. We then told Robin Davey exactly what the AFP had told us and asked Mr Davey if he believed we were legally bound to do as the AFP had requested, considering that these matters were to be assessed by the COT assessor. We were then ALL told that, as our matters were now part of an official Government-orchestrated investigation, which had been passed on to the AFP by AUSTEL under the direction of the relevant Minister, then we had no alternative but to supply the AFP with whatever related material we had uncovered because, after all, this investigation was for the good of the whole nation, as well as for any future investigations that might arise as a result of our co-operation.
Sometime later, while I was in Melbourne, in July 1994, as part of a discussion I had with John MacMahon, AUSTEL’s General Manager of Consumer Affairs, I reminded him of that two-day meeting mentioned above; I reminded him that it had taken place in AUSTEL’s headquarters in Melbourne, and I reminded him of Robin Davey’s instructions concerning our duty to provide our FOI documents to the AFP during the settlement process (which had now become an arbitration). I also mentioned the threats I had received from Telstra after they had somehow found out that I was still continuing to help the AFP. Later, on 26 September 1994, AFP Detective Sergeant Jeff Penrose told me that the AFP had NOT informed Telstra that I was continuing to provide the AFP with assistance, which clearly means that the only way Telstra could have obtained this information was either from listening to my phone calls to or from the AFP, or by intercepting the FOI documents I faxed to the AFP. Mr Penrose’s off-the-record response was ‘sharp’, to say the least, especially since he was in no way obliged to comment at all.
I truly believe that Mr MacMahon was definitely shocked when I told him about this off-the-record conversation with Mr Penrose just as I believe that was why Mr MacMahon reminded me that, regardless of Telstra’s threats, I was still obliged to help the AFP. He also explained that, if those threats from Telstra continued, then I should raise them with the arbitrator because these matters were now part of my arbitration and so AUSTEL could not become involved. Mr MacMahon used words to the affect that, as AUSTEL had passed on this part of their own investigation into COT matters, and the AFP had instructed us COTs that we were legally obliged to assist the AFP and the Government (particularly since the Government had passed our matters to the AFP in the first place), then we had no choice but to continue to help the AFP wherever we could. We were told that, under these circumstances, the arbitrator could not penalise ANY of the COT claimants for raising these matters with the AFP, outside of the arbitration process. Mr McMahon also maintained that Telstra’s threatening manner, and the wider ramifications for the overall submission of my claim, should also be raised with the TIO, Warwick Smith.
I contacted both Warwick Smith and Gordon Hughes and, as of May 2019, neither of them have provided any advice in relation to this matter.
AUSTEL writes to Telstra on 10 February 1994 stating:
“Yesterday we were called upon by officers of the Australian Federal Police in relation to the taping of the telephone services of COT Cases.
“Given the investigation now being conducted by that agency and the responsibilities imposed on AUSTEL by section 47 of the Telecommunications Act 1991, the nine tapes previously supplied by Telecom to AUSTEL were made available for the attention of the Commissioner of Police.” (See Illegal Interception File No/3)
From 10-15 February 1994, we lost any chance we may have had for a Senate inquiry into, what the COT members believed, the unethical way Telstra continued to treat us. By mid-February 1994, it appeared that not only was Telstra treating us with sheer contempt, but also they were doing this in full view of the Senate. The COT members began to believe that no single person or organisation, anywhere in Australia, had the courage to initiate a judicial inquiry into the way Telstra continued to thumb their noses at the government.
Imagine having to write to Telstra’s solicitors, to lodge my phone complaints! Was this Telstra’s way of breaking my morale? Consider having to report every telephone fault, in writing, to a solicitor.
As discussed in Arbitrator Part One, Chapter Three to Six, the TIO wanted to use a legal arbitration agreement, which he informed the government and claimants his own legal counsel (who was also the then president of the Institute of Arbitrators) drafted, completely independent of Telstra. He maintained that the commercial assessor was fully qualified to arbitrate on the four COT cases, which, as Arbitrator Part Two shows, he was not. Our assessor was to become our arbitrator.
We COT members registered our disagreement with this through the TIO (the appointed independent administrator of the Fast Track Settlement Process). We made it very clear to the TIO that the four of us were already involved in a signed and agreed commercial process and we saw no clear reason for changing that situation. We believed an arbitration process would certainly never be ‘fast-tracked’. It was bound to become legalistic and drawn out and we knew none of us had the finances to go up against Telstra’s high-powered legal team in such a process. We believed the whole idea of arbitration was raised simply to suit Telstra’s agenda.
Between 6-8 February that year, Graham Schorer had a telephone conversation with the TIO. Graham wanted to discuss the reasons the COT four were rejecting the arbitration process. The TIO dismissed our reasons immediately. The TIO said his primary role was Telecommunications Ombudsman and that he had spent too much time focusing on his secondary role as administrator of our FTSP. He was concerned his office had incurred considerable expense because of this administrating role and he told Graham that Telstra was refusing to reimburse those expenses. He also indicated that his office would not continue to incur expenses on our behalf.
Furthermore, he informed Graham that if the COT four did not abandon their commercial agreement with Telstra, then Telstra would pull out all stops to force us into a position where we would have to take them to court to resolve our commercial losses. Telstra, the new arbitrator and the TIO were all aware that none of us had the financial resources to enter into a court case.
My then-accountant Selwyn Cohen informed me that faxes from my office were not arriving complete; pages were missing. He recommended I should neither move from the commercial process into arbitration while these phone problems were ongoing nor sign the agreement while the AFP were investigating this unlawful interception of my telephone and faxing problems.
I met with the TIO in March 1994 after this consultation with Selwyn and said it was an unworkable process while the phone problems were still there and while I was raising interception as a claim issue.
The arbitration process should have been put on hold until it was shown the faults had stopped and the AFP had concluded their findings. It was impossible for the arbitrator to call for interception documents at the same time the AFP was asking for the same.
The TIO’s response was that we must sign the arbitration. As if this wasn’t disastrous enough, the TIO added that if we decided to take legal action in an attempt to compel Telstra to honour their original commercial assessment agreement, then he would resign as administrator of the procedure. This would force the conclusion of the Fast Track Settlement Process and commit us to each taking legal action, with no other alternatives, to resolve our claims. The TIO did not care about the claimants right.
In fact, when I raised these interception issues with AUSTEL’s John MacMahon, General Manager of Consumer Affairs, he told me that, under Section 47 of the Telecommunications Act 1991, AUSTEL was obliged to ensure that the Australian Federal Police were assisted with these interception issues, which included the COT Cases who had raised these matters with AUSTEL. Of course Mr MacMahon would not have thought for one minute that, once I started providing the AFP with FOI documents that confirmed that Telstra had been monitoring my private and business affairs, I would be penalized by Telstra, as we have shown below in Chapter Four of the Senate Evidence File No 31. Regardless of who thought what, however, or what might have been expected to happen once the COT Cases assisted the AFP, Telstra retaliation should have been considered before the COT Cases were forced into arbitration while the AFP investigations were still in progress.
After we four COT cases signed our Fast Track Arbitration Proposal, on 23 November 1993, neither AUSTEL, as the government communications regulator nor the Federal Labor Government warned us that our arbitration fax and phone interception issues would be broadcast to the media as well as discussed in parliament, as the many downloads of Australian Federal Police (AFP) documents on absentjustice.com show was the case. As these interceptions were one subject of our four arbitration claims, AUSTEL, as the Fast Track Settlement Proposal facilitator, should have kept these matters confidential. By broadcasting that information or allowing it to be discussed in the media, AUSTEL severely disadvantaged our claims.
Our phone and fax interception issues were headline news over many months, not only in our local newspapers but also in ALL the major national newspapers. On 15 April 1994, ex-prime minister of Australia, Malcolm Fraser, discussed my phone interception issues in the SunHerald newspaper and how FOI documents discuss his and my telephone conversations being transcribed onto Telstra file notes. Herald Sun, newspaper reported:
“FORMER prime minister Malcolm Fraser yesterday demanded Telecom explain why his name appears in a restricted internal memo.
“Mr Fraser’s request follows the release of a damning government report this week which criticised Telecom for recording conversations without customer permission.
“Mr Fraser said Mr Alan Smith, of the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp near Portland, phoned him early last year seeking advice on a long-running dispute with Telecom which Mr Fraser could not help.” (See Our Saga File No 2)
Who within the Telstra Corporation thought it was important to note that I had telephoned Malcolm Fraser? Is my conversation with the former prime minister on one of the nine audio tapes AUSTEL provided to the Australian Federal Police, but refused to supply copies to the COT cases? I was, at no time, suspected of committing a crime or being a possible risk to Australia’s national security.
AUSTEL knew these matters were confidential and were to form part of our confidential arbitration process; however, AUSTEL provided the AFP with NINE audiotapes of our telephone conversations in February 1994 (see Illegal Interception File No/3) but withheld the same information from us four COT cases. What legal right did the government’s communications regulator have to provide our arbitration evidence to ONLY the AFP and not the four claimants who would need this evidence to secure that part of our arbitration claims? Even Senator Richard Alston (then Shadow Minister for Communications) demanded answers in the Senate as to why this evidence was withheld from us four COT cases.
As I have already shown in our absentjustice.com/Australian Federal Police Investigations page, Telstra records, which I provided to the AFP during its 1994 interception investigations, showed Telstra was monitoring members of my Over-Forties Singles Club patrons as well as the movements of both myself and staff. The AFP maintained this evidence should only be viewed by the arbitrator and under confidentiality. That all of these arbitration privacy issues were being discussed in the Senate, as well as nationally in the media, was a major security issue and something I had no control over. I was not just being questioned by the AFP and AUSTEL on these privacy issues, but members of my singles club also wanted to know whether private discussions held over the telephone, including faxes sent to and from the holiday camp, were part of the AFP investigations. Of course, I had no alternative but to advise my singles club members, as well as every day patrons, about the security issues.
Nothing was private once the AUSTEL, the TIO (the administrator of my arbitration) and the ex-prime minister of Australia broadcast my interception issues to the public.
My 3 February 1994 letter to Michael Lee, Minister for Communications (see Hacking-Julian Assange File No/27-A) and a subsequent letter from Fay Holthuyzen, assistant to the minister (see Hacking-Julian Assange File No/27-B) to Telstra’s corporate secretary, show I was concerned that my faxes were being illegally intercepted.
An internal government memo, dated 25 February 1994, confirms that the minister advised me that the AFP would investigate my allegations of illegal phone/fax interception. (See Hacking-Julian Assange File No/28)
25 February 1994: This internal Government Memo confirms that the then-Minister for Communications and the Arts had written to me to advise that the Australian Federal Police (AFP) would investigate my allegations of illegal phone/fax interception. (AFP Evidence File No 4)
18 March 1994: This letter from Steve Black, Telstra’s appointed arbitration liaison officer to my arbitration process wrote to Robin Davey, Chairman of AUSTEL AFP Evidence File No 6 under the heading Tape Recorders – Use In Locating Fax Faults noting: 25 February 1994: When this letter to Telstra’s Corporate Secretary from Fay Holthuyzen, Assistant to the Minister for Communications, Michael Lee, is compared to the letter dated 3 February 1994 Exhibit that I sent to the Minister’s office it is clear that I was concerned that his faxes were being illegally intercepted (AFP Evidence File No 5)
“In a small number of cases, where the customer indicates that the problem is specific to transmission between two particular facsimile machines then, with the consent of the customers controlling those facsimile machines, the test transmission between these facsimiles machines will be taped and analysed.
In these cases, recording would be carried out in circumstances where:
- the customer’s consent has been confirmed in writing by facsimiles or otherwise;
- the recording would be of signals generated by a test message;
- there is no B party involved.” (see AFP Evidence File No 6)
I was never warned, either prior, during his arbitrations or, during the seven years after his arbitration, that Telstra was intercepting his faxes as part of their testing process – or for any other reason for that matter – and neither did I ever provide Telstra with written permission for this interception to occur, even though this letter to Mr Davey (AFP File 6) is quite clear that it was mandatory for Telstra to apply for written permission to use tape recorders when intercepting phone calls and/or faxes.
While we are not glorifying Julian Assange in this Hacking Julian Assange Chapter Three segment as an Australian national hero to the free world, it is still a fact, that he and his young friends played a very important part in the first four COT arbitrations. The profile of these youths fit the profile of Julian Assange mentioned in a number of editorials i.e. justice for all. We have discussed this hacking issue because if it was was not Julian Assange and his young friends who contacted COT spokesperson Graham Schorer, then someone else in Melbourne Australia decided to expose what they had uncovered concerning Telstra’s unlawful conduct during the COT arbitrations. Therefore, it was important we raise the Julian Assange issue here because of the serious nature of what these hackers saw as an injustice against fellow Australian citizens.
Enter the Hackers
After contacting me to discuss this offer, Graham Schorer and I decided not to accept this information. We were of the belief that accepting damning evidence outside the due process of discovery and/or FOI could be seen as acting unlawfully.
It is now apparent from two publications – one titled The Most Dangerous Man In The World by renowned investigative journalist Andrew Fowler and the other by Dr Suelette Dreyfus and Julian Assange, titled Underground – that it was Julian Assange and his companions who contacted Graham.
We again stress, our only contact with Mr Assange was back when he was one of the young hackers who contacted Graham Schorer, when Graham was the official COT spokesperson, warning him he and his computer friends had uncovered damning information concerning our arbitrations. That information was related to the ongoing telephone problems in Telstra’s network and how Telstra, and others, had been acting against us outside of the law to our detriment. At the time, we alerted the administrator of our arbitration process to this information and the administrator then advised Graham that the hackers had been ‘apprehended’, but he would not tell Graham what he and/or the authorities had uncovered during their investigations into the information the hackers wanted to share with us. Sometime later the same administrator (Warwick Smith) was advised, by his own arbitration unit, that there had been ‘forces at work’ that had ‘derailed’ the COT arbitrations (see Chapter One Prologue page). Regardless of this inside official information from Warwick Smith’s own arbitration unit (which supported what and hackers had told us) was concealed from the COT Cases during their designated appeal processes. Once again the hackers had been right that it was not only Telstra who were acting unethically towards us during our arbitrations.
Also stated on our front page Absentjustice my story we show two important events that support my belief that it was Julian Assange who told Graham how disgusted he was at Telstra’s treatment of the COT Cases: first – the Andrew Fowler and Suelette Dreyfus books and their individual discussions about how Julian Assange and his young team had hacked into Telstra’s Melbourne telephone exchange and second – the fact that Warwick Smith warned Graham Schorer that the hackers ‘had been apprehended’. And, don’t forget, all this occurred back when Telstra was still owned by the Australian Government.
It is appalling that it took a Senate Committee and an Officer from the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office almost two years (between September 1997 and March 1999) to uncover the same information that Mr Assange had uncovered years earlier. At the very least it certainly leaves a lot to be desired.
In hindsight, had COT cases accepted the internal Telstra emails and faxes the hackers offered, we would have won our arbitrations back in 1994. At the time, however, we suspected this contact from the hackers were either a Telstra trick or a trick by the government to catch us red-handed with ill-gotten documents, which would have ended our arbitrations. The hackers kept telling Graham that those actually conducting the arbitrations were involved in this giant conspiracy.
Hacking / Unresolved Privacy Issues
Between June 2011 and June 2012, I sent a number of letters to the Hon Robert Clark, Victorian attorney-general, regarding the prolonged, unauthorised interception of Graham Schorer’s and my faxes during and after our arbitrations. Three replies (dated 12 October 2011, 23 March 2012 and 2 July 2012) are in Main Evidence File No 10. Each response, all headed Interception of facsimiles, stipulated that the Department of Justice cannot investigate interception of faxes, even though I provided documented proof of:
- The interception of faxes exchanged between lawyers and their clients while they were involved in Supreme Court proceedings;
- The interception of faxes to and from the arbitrator while the other COT claimants and I were involved in a federal government-endorsed arbitration;
- Telstra’s admission to the Australian Federal Police that Telstra intercepted my telephone conversations.
SENATE Hansard, page 5169 discusses a document titled COT strategy (which is available at Prologue Evidence File 1-A to 1-C) showing that even before the arbitrations had begun Telstra and their lawyers had colluded on how to conceal technical documents from the first four COT Cases. Garms, Gillan, Schorer and me. Just imagine had Graham Schorer and I had not been afraid that this offer by the hackers was a setup by Telstra to trick us COT Cases into accepting documents from an illegal source. Had we fallen for this method of discovery we would have been expelled by the administrators from the arbitration process. On this occasions being honest did not pay because had we received the various emails we now have on file including the information contained in Prologue Evidence File 1-A to 1-C we could have been able to use these documents to prove Telstra and their lawyers had conspired to pervert the course of justice before we entered the arbitration. In simple terms, Not listening to these computer hackers went onto destroying many of the COT Cases lives and the lives of their families.
It is important to note that just prior to these hackers contacting Graham, in March 1994, Mr Schorer’s office was broken into in. I was also assisting the Australian Federal Police (AFP) with their investigations into my claims of fax interceptions. Hacking-Julian Assanage File No 52 contains a letter from Telstra’s internal corporate solicitor to an AFP detective superintendent, misinforming the AFP concerning the transmission fax testing process. The rest of the file shows Telstra did experience major problems when testing my facsimile machine when it was tested in conjunction with a facsimile machine installed at Graham’s office.
It is important to highlight how skilfully Mr Row did not disclose to the AFP the problems Telstra had experienced when sending and receiving faxes between my machine and Graham’s fax machine.
Although the following 22 April 1994 fax issue is addressed above, it relates directly to AUSTEL only receiving three blank pages, even though AUSTEL’s fax report shows these pages took between 1min 20sec to 2min 40sec to transmit. (See Hacking-Julian Assange File No/34-A and File No/34-B)
None of those three blank pages had my fax identification displayed at the top of the received documents nor the time and date that they were sent. However, they all had a single, small square in the top right corner of the page, each with a number inside it.
Even if blank sheets of paper are faxed mistakenly instead of printed documents, they will still arrive with the sender’s identity, the date and the time the document was sent. As I later proved to the arbitrator, these blank documents did not include any sender identification. The arbitrator, however, for reasons known only to him, never investigated this apparent interception of my arbitration claim documents – clearly an invasion of my privacy – just as he didn’t investigate the threats and harassment from senior Telstra executives that I ruined any chance or proving my phone problems were ongoing.
In this Chapter Four here AFP Link, we provide further examples of relevant documents not reaching the arbitration process for assessment. The young computer hackers contacted the COT cases twice in early 1994 to advise they had hacked into Telstra’s email service and uncovered Telstra acting unlawfully towards the COT cases. They asked if we wanted the evidence. We refused to accept this evidence, as we were concerned we were being set-up. We notified the authorities and as these hackers and Julian Assange were caught around the same time, this suggests we unwittingly played a part in his arrest. It is now obvious the hackers were telling the truth about Telstra’s conduct towards the COT cases, but COT spokesperson, Graham Schorer, remembers the hackers implied it was not only Telstra people who were acted inappropriately towards us; they indicated they uncovered other people who were working against us from within the process itself, who were also acting inappropriately. Unless the hackers decide to contact us again now, in 2020, to explain who those other people were, which is of course highly unlikely, we will probably never know for sure.
Telstra had so much power over the then government communications regulator AUSTEL that it was able to force AUSTEL to drastically reduce the numbers included in AUSTEL’s original COT Case April 1994 Report, from some 120,000 COT-type customers who were having similar problems, right around Australia, to just 50-plus. Were these the letters from Telstra to AUSTEL (see Falsification Report File No/8) that prompted the hackers to advise COT case spokesperson Graham Schorer that the government was assisting Telstra in their defence of the COT cases claims? Why didn’t the Telecommunication Industry Ombudsman (the administrator of our arbitrations) transparently investigate what Mr Schorer and I reported concerning the type of documents the hackers wanted to provide the arbitration process with?
On the covering page of a joint 10-page letter dated 11 July 2011 to the Hon Robert McClelland, federal attorney-general and the Hon Robert Clark, Victorian attorney-general, I note:
“In 1994 three young computer hackers telephoned Graham Schorer, the official Spokesperson for the Casualties of Telstra (COT) in relation to their Telstra arbitrations.
- Was Jullian Assange one of these hackers?
- The hackers believed they had found evidence that Telstra was acting illegally.
- In other words, we were fools not to have accepted this arbitration file when it was offered to us by the hackers who conveyed to Graham Schorer a sense of the enormity of the deception and misconduct undertaken [sic] by Telstra against the COT Cases.” (See Exhibit 818 in File AS-CAV 790 to 818)
It is also clear from my joint letter of 20 June 2012 to both Attorney-General see exhibit 818 File AS-CAV 790 to 818), that I alerted them to my letter to John Pinnock (TIO) on 20 October 1995, concerning what the hackers had exposed to Graham Schorer surrounding the conduct of our TIO-administered arbitrations.
I also wrote to the Hon Robert Clark on 20 June 2012, to remind him that his office was already in receipt of a 7 July 2011 statutory declaration prepared by Graham Schorer. This statutory declaration discusses the three young computer hackers who phoned Graham during the COT arbitrations of 1994 to warn him. They had discovered that Telstra and others associated with the arbitrations were ‘acting unlawfully’ towards the COT group. Graham’s statutory declaration includes the following statements:
“After I signed the arbitration agreement on 21st April 1994 I received a phone call after business hours when I was working back late in the office. This call was to my unpublished direct number.
“The young man on the other end asked for me by name. When I had confirmed I was the named person, he stated that he and his two friends had gained internal access to Telstra’s records, internal emails, memos, faxes, etc. He stated that he did not like what they had uncovered. He suggested that I should talk to Frank Blount directly. He offered to give me his direct lines in the his [sic] Melbourne and Sydney offices…
“The caller tried to stress that it was Telstra’s conduct towards me and the other COT members that they were trying to bring to our attention.
“I queried whether he knew that Telstra had a Protective Services department, whose task was to maintain the security of the network. They laughed, and said that yes they did, as they were watching them (Telstra) looking for them (the hackers). …
“After this call, I spoke to Alan Smith about the matter. We agreed that while the offer was tempting we decided we should only obtain our arbitration documents through the designated process agreed to before we signed the agreement.” (See Hacking – Julian Assange File No/3)
What we later found out concerning the type of in-house emails that these hackers wanted to share appears to have been associated with correspondence, between Telstra, its lawyers, and AUSTEL, discussing vital information that Telstra and its lawyers wanted the government to remove from their COT cases report. The only thing we COT cases have at present that resembles the type of evidence the hackers wanted to provide to us is two letters between Telstra and AUSTEL, dated 8 and 9 April 1994 (see Introduction File No/8-A to 8-C). These letters demand AUSTEL remove its true finding from its public report – stating that some 120,000 COT-type complaints had been located – and replace that figure with hundreds or more COT type complaints, which AUSTEL did by stating in the formal report:
“…the number of Telecom customers experiencing COT type service difficulties and faults is substantially higher than Telecom’s original estimate of 50” (See Manipulating the Regulator, Chapter Three).
The fact that Telstra had so much power over a government communications regulator that it was able to force it to drastically reduce the numbers included in AUSTEL’s COT Case April 1994 fings, from some 120,000 COT-type customers who were having similar problems, right around Australia, to just 50-plus, is mind-blowing, to say the least.
Were these the same letters from Telstra to AUSTEL (see (see Falsification Report File No/8) that prompted the hackers to advise COT case spokesperson Graham Schorer that the government was assisting Telstra in their defence of the COT cases claims i.e. our arbitrations were not being conducted under the rule of law? What did the hackers find amongst Telstra arbitration documents in order for them to form the opinion that the rule of law was not being abided too?
Why didn’t the Telecommunication Industry Ombudsman (the administrator of our arbitrations) transparently investigate what Mr Schorer and I reported concerning the type of documents the hackers wanted to provide the arbitration process with?
Agreeing to this alteration, at the defendant’s request (Telstra was, after all, the defendant in our arbitrations), devalued the government report to where it was now a fabricated document being used by the arbitrator, unaware it was severely tainted. The fact that it was used as evidence in the COT arbitrations appears not to have worried AUSTEL, but it did worry the hackers to the extent of them contacting Graham.
My letters to the two aforementioned Attorney-General’s also recorded other valuable information that we COT Cases had uncovered, just like the young hackers, concerning the very same matters that the hackers had found, as well as information regarding what Telstra was doing ‘behind the scenes, during our arbitrations. It was clear that Telstra’s secret behaviour in relation to the COTs had only one aim: to stop any of the matters raised by COT from being revealed to the Government, or to the public, at the time (1994), even though all those matters were of national importance to all Australians.
The following link at https://assangedefense.org/ is a more updated account of what is currently happening to Julian Assange as he fights the system that wants him destroyed.
Regarding our COT arbitrations did the hackers uncover:
- Evidence Dr Hughes was forced, under pressure from the Establishment, to use Telstra’s drafted arbitration agreement instead of the agreed, independently drafted agreement all relevant parties were told would be used?;
- Evidence the arbitrator agreed with the defendants that he and his arbitration project manager would only assess a limited amount of claim documents in order to minimise Telstra’s liability? (See Arbitrator Part Two, Chapter Nine and Ten);
- Evidence that Telstra and the TIO agreed to secretly appoint a second arbitrator who would decide which arbitration procedural documents would reach the official arbitrator (Dr Gordon Hughes) and which would be concealed? (See Arbitrator Part One, Chapter Seven);
- Evidence confirming someone with access to Telstra’s fax screening process were diverting arbitration claim documents to a designated filing system before they were redirected onto their intended destination? (See Open Letter File No/12, 13, 16 and File No/17).
In my case, even though the arbitrator’s secretary advised the arbitration process that six of my faxed claim documents never reached the arbitrator’s office, I was never afforded the opportunity to resubmit this material for assessment. My fax account shows I dialled the correct fax number on all six occasions.
As we have explained on our throughout absentjustice.com, we have broken this complex story up into sections in the hope of providing clarity. There are many people and organisations involved in this collusion and perversion of the course of justice, including government officials, the arbitrator, the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman and the defendants (Telstra). A number of different headings apply to many of the issues. To avoid repeating the beginning of the story on each webpage, the Hacking – Julian Assange section begins mid-1994 and reveals the details of how incompetently COT arbitrations were handled, beginning with the lead-up to the process in 1994 and from then on.
Because, not long into our arbitrations, Graham Schorer (the official COT spokesperson) received two phone calls within a couple of days, both from young people. They told Graham they knew we were in arbitration with Telstra and wanted to alert him to what they had discovered when they hacked into Telstra’s email network: they had found documents confirming that there were people close to our arbitration – as well as Telstra – who were acting unlawfully towards us. Both times they rang they asked if we would like them to send us that evidence.
Graham and I discussed the offer of the first call but, although we were interested in what Graham had heard, we finally said NO on the second call. We were concerned this might be a set-up by Telstra and therefore if we agreed to accept this promising material, then both our arbitrations might be declared null and void – especially if we accepted Telstra documents that had been deliberately tampered with.
Since then Andrew Fowler and Suelette Dreyfus have each published books referring to Julian Assange’s hacking into Telstra’s Lonsdale Telephone Exchange in Melbourne, which both Graham’s business and mine were trunked through. In hindsight, we probably should have accepted that very kind offer. We might well have been able to use that evidence against Telstra all those years ago and perhaps we would not be here writing our story 20 years later.
Graham’s statutory declaration about these two 1994 phone calls is discussed below. However, some issues we discuss elsewhere on the website are also relevant to this page; issues such as fax and telephone hacking, submission of false material to arbitration and harassment. Australian Federal Police transcripts (see Australian Federal Police Investigation File No/1) support my assertion that during my 1992 commercial settlement process with Telecom/Telstra and through to at least 1994 (during my government-endorsed arbitration procedure) the Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp telephone services were live monitored and my business was under surveillance.
Telstra email K01006, dated Thursday 7 April 1994, at 2.05 pm raises two issues. Firstly this date falls during the time I was involved in the Regulator-designed commercial agreement with Telstra and secret observations would surely seem to be inappropriate, at the very least. Secondly, this document refers to a time when I would be away from his business during this pending arbitration process. The author of the email states:
“Mr Alan Smith is absent from his premises from 5/8/94 – 8/8/94. On other occasions when he has been absent there have been documented complaints received (usually months later) involving NRR etc. I called the premises at approx 4:55 pm 6/4/94. The answer time was 41 secs.
I intend on this occasion to document his absence and file all data I can collect for the period. That way we should be prepared for anything that follows.”
Clearly, the writer knew, in April of 1994, that I planned to be away later that year, in August. In other words, he knew of my movements, four months in advance.
The then-Minister for Communications, the TIO and the Federal Police were all supplied with this document, along with a number of other documents indicating that my private telephone conversations were being ‘bugged’.Another FOI document Folio 000605, clearly shows that the writer knew when “…Smith is in Melbourne”. I used to go to Melbourne (see AFP Evidence File No 8) on promotional tours to various single clubs advertising what outdoor activities we were packaging for two and three night stop-overs. Horse riding, canoeing, caving and bush-walking. How could the writer have this information, if someone hadn’t listened to this call to find out when I was going and which local girl would be on duty at the camp? Anyone reading the AFP transcripts from their interview with me on 26 September 1994 (see AFP Evidence File No 1) they will see that the AFP documented many examples where unless Telstra was not listening into my private telephone conversations they would not have been able to document what they had on these FOI documents. Telstra have never been able to explain how they came by this information. At other times, this same person has also stated that he knew I had spoken to Malcolm Fraser, former Australian Prime Minister, on the phone, and when that conversation took place. (AFP Evidence File No 7) He insists I told him about this conversation, but this is not true. Again, Telstra has never been able to find a convincing explanation for their employee having this information. Obviously Telstra was still listening to my private calls, even though he was then involved in litigation with them and their lawyers.
Listening to private calls is appalling enough, but the following information is even more damning. Page A133 of the official Senate Hansard records dated 25 February 1994 states that the then-Shadow Minister for Communications questioned the Regulator’s Chairman, asking:
“Why did not Austel immediately refer COT’s allegations of voice recording to the federal police instead of waiting for the minister to refer the matter to the Attorney-General and then on to the federal police?
A copy of a letter dated 2 March 1994, from Telstra’s Corporate Solicitor, Ian Row, to Detective Superintendent Jeff Penrose (see Home Page Part-One File No/9-A to 9-C). This letter makes it quite clear that Mr Penrose was profoundly misled and deceived about the faxing problems I was having to deal with, as discussed in this letter. Over the years, many people have compared the four exhibits numbered (File No/9-C) with the interception evidence revealed in Open Letter File No/12, and File No/13 and promptly concluded that, if Ian Row had not misled the AFP in relation to my faxing issues then the AFP would have been able to stop Telstra from intercepting the various relevant AFP arbitration documents in March 1994, before any damage had been done.
The then-Minister for Communications, the TIO and the Federal police were all supplied with this document, along with a number of other documents indicating my private telephone conversations were being ‘bugged’. Another FOI document, Folio 000605, shows the writer knew when “…Smith is in Melbourne”. I used to go to Melbourne (see AFP Evidence File No 8) on promotional tours to various single clubs advertising the outdoor activities we were packaging for two and three night stays. This information could only have been gleaned from listening into this call to find out when I was going and which staff member would be on duty at the camp. Anyone reading the AFP transcripts of my interview on 26 September 1994 (see AFP Evidence File No 7) will see the AFP documented many examples Telstra must have listened into our private telephone conversations in order to document the details in these FOI documents. Open Letter File No/12 and File No/13 prove COT cases’ faxes were intercepted during their arbitrations.
At Australian Federal Police Investigations, there is a detailed description of how Dr Hughes (the arbitrator) spent five, non-stop hours interrogating me in front of two of Telstra’s arbitration defence officers. This interrogation included questions that were clearly made in an attempt to discover how far the Australian Federal Police had reached, during their investigations into issues that the then-Government Minister, Michael Lee MP, had officially asked them to investigate, in relation to whether or not my faxes were indeed being intercepted or had just been lost in the system. This sort of interrogation was, however, forbidden under the rules of the signed arbitration agreement but, in Australia, when you challenge the Telstra Corporation, you have absolutely no chance of finding justice!
In January 1999, the arbitration claimants provided the Australian government with a report confirming confidential, arbitration-related documents were secretly and illegally screened before they arrived at their intended destination. In my case, even though the arbitrator’s secretary advised the arbitration process that six of my faxed claim documents never reached the arbitrator’s office, I was never afforded the opportunity to resubmit this material for assessment. My fax account shows I dialed the correct fax number on all six occasions.
NONE of the COT cases was ever on a terrorist list in 1994 (or since, for that matter) and none of us was ever listed as suspects regarding any crimes committed against any Australian citizens. Why were our in-confidence arbitration and Telstra-related documents hacked by Telstra? In my case, 42 separate sets of correspondence faxed to the arbitrator’s office (some with attachments) are not listed on the Arbitration Schedules of Material as received by the arbitration process. Front Page Part One File No/1 shows the arbitrator’s secretary advised Tony Watson (of Telstra’s arbitration defence unit) that on 23 May 1994 six of my claim documents did not reach arbitrator’s fax machine. Yet, I was charged on my Telstra account for those six faxes. When this matter was exposed, no one from the arbitrator’s office nor the TIO’s office allowed me to amend my claim so that proven “not received” claim documents were valued by the arbitrator in support of my claim.
The 24 January 1995 letter was faxed to the arbitrators’ office. Is there a connection between the loss of my faxed arbitration documents and the TIO’s 28 June 1995 letter stating that his office has no record of my 24 January 1995 letter to the arbitrator requesting him to seek various documents from Telstra under the discovery process? My 24 January 1995 letter requesting a copy of the Cape Bridgewater/Bell Canada information to be provided from Telstra through the arbitration process was received (see Front Page Part One File No/2-A to 2-E).
Why did the TIO advise me that records in his office did not record receiving my 24 January 1995 letter? “Our file does not indicate that you took the matter any further,” When my letter was returned to me, the fax footprint indicates it was received at the arbitrator’s fax machine. The TIO’s 28 June 1995 letter is possibly one of our most damning pieces of evidence, showing that “forces at work” were able to conceal essential arbitration material from being addressed during my arbitration process.
If the arbitrator had acted on my requests for the Cape Bridgewater/Bell Canada test information, which I was legally entitled to have, I could have proved the Bell Canada International could not possibly generate the alleged 13,500 test calls through a Tekelec CCS7 system that they and Telstra stated was installed at the Cape Bridgewater RCM exchange. There was no equipment in place at the Bridgewater exchange to facilitate such tests. The nearest Telstra exchange that could facilitate a Tekelec CCS7 monitoring system in November 1993 was the Warrnambool exchange, which is 112 kilometres from Cape Bridgewater. The TIO and Commonwealth Ombudsman records will confirm I requested the BCI information on at least four occasions.
It is serious enough that an Australian corporation knowingly provided false answers to questions on notice during a Senate committee hearing, however, consider: if the TIO is telling the truth that the arbitrator did NOT receive my 24 January 1995 BCI letter, then who did? And why do the markings on this document show that it arrived at its intended destination? My own BCI report shows Telstra even went as far as knowingly providing false Cape Bridgewater information to the Senate in October 1994. As a result, the Senate estimates committee did not investigate the fundamentally flawed BCI Cape Bridgewater report.
Front Page Part One File No/2-A to 2-E shows this important arbitration documents, faxed by me to the arbitrator on 24 January 1995, did reach the arbitrators’ office. As we have shown on this website other similar documents faxed from my office were never received (assessed) by the arbitrator.
Before we continue this chapter we ask the reader to consider the following:
Open Letter File No/12, and File No/13 prove COT cases’ faxes were intercepted during their arbitrations. So, with that firmly in mind, first try to imagine the people assigned to intercept the many COT arbitration documents, as they left each of our individual premises, heading to the arbitrator, our financial advisors or our technical advisers. Try to imagine what it might have been like for those people, studiously chasing up and illegally intercepting our legal documents as they travelled around the fax circuit. Try to imagine doing this every single day because, particularly at the peak of our arbitrations, most of the COTs were constantly using the fax system to send documents all over the place! Then, change tack a bit, and try to imagine you are one of us, a member of the COT group, just an ordinary Australian citizen, running an ordinary Australian small business: an ordinary person who trusts the government to do the right thing by ALL Australian citizens. And, so, while you work at keeping your small business afloat, you also write up submissions, prepare legal documents (something you have never done before) and work hard to learn your way around complex technical documents, sometimes with an advisor at your side, but mostly alone.
Try to imagine what it would be like if, after all that effort, even before your documents reached their intended destinations, the defendant hijacks them as part of its reprehensible plot, so it could assess your documents, before they reach their intended destinations, because what this meant was that the defendant gained extra time along with the critical advantage of knowing, in advance, what was to come in the next part of the arbitration process. This was a huge advantage for the defendant because, of course, that knowledge also gave them time to decide which aspect of the claim would be easy to defend and which it would be best to completely avoid. Now try to imagine what that would have felt like for the claimants, when they eventually discovered what had been going on, in secret. At the same time, remember that, as we record elsewhere on absentjustice.com, some of those documents that we sent off, through what should have been a secure fax system, never arrived at their intended destination at all.
I know this seems too fanciful to be true but I am not Robert Ludlum or John Grisham spinning a story here, not even vaguely, because all this really did happen here in Australia, a supposedly democratic country, not all that long ago – in the years between 1994 and 2001, as Open Letter File No/12, to File No/20 show. In fact, our evidence shows that this fax hacking started at the very beginning of 1994, during the first process, which was called the Fast Track Settlement Proposal. Now, as you read on, imagine you are sitting at your desk in your office, just like the COT members often did. You’ve been up most of the night, working on your claim, and both your privacy and the fax system (which everyone used back then) are about to be violated, yet again, by the defendant, without your knowledge or consent, and the government you pay your taxes to is NOT willing to investigate or assist you, as your business vanishes before your eyes.
NONE of the COT cases should have been forced to sign our 1994 arbitrations while the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were investigating the possibility that our arbitration faxes were being illegally hacking (screened by Telstra) before they arrived at their intended destination. It is clear the rights of the COT Cases were violated in the most deplorable fashion.
It is also important to note that just prior to these hackers contacting Graham, in March 1994, Mr Schorer’s office was broken into in. I was also assisting the Australian Federal Police (AFP) with their investigations into my claims of fax interceptions. Hacking-Julian Assanage File No 52 contains a letter from Telstra’s internal corporate solicitor to an AFP detective superintendent, misinforming the AFP concerning the transmission fax testing process. The rest of the file shows Telstra did experience major problems when testing my facsimile machine, when it was tested in conjunction with a facsimile machine installed at Graham’s office.
It is important to highlight how skilfully Mr Row did not disclose to the AFP the problems Telstra had experienced when sending and receiving faxes between my machine and Graham’s fax machine.
Although the following 22 April 1994 fax issue is addressed above, it relates directly to AUSTEL only receiving three blank pages, even though AUSTEL’s fax report shows these pages took between 1min 20sec to 2min 40sec to transmit. (See Hacking-Julian Assange File No/34-A and File No/34-B)
None of those three blank pages had my fax identification displayed at the top of the received documents nor the time and date that they were sent. However, they all had a single, small square in the top right corner of the page, each with a number inside it.
Even if blank sheets of paper are faxed mistakenly instead of printed documents, they will still arrive with the sender’s identity, the date and the time the document was sent. As I later proved to the arbitrator, these blank documents did not include any sender identification. The arbitrator, however, for reasons known only to him, never investigated this apparent interception of my arbitration claim documents – clearly an invasion of my privacy – just as he didn’t investigate the threats and harassment from senior Telstra executives that I was subjected to throughout my arbitration.
The 22 April 1994 fax issue also relates directly to a fax issue on 29 June 1998, four years after my arbitration, which was supposed to address these faxing problems. My solicitor, Mr William Hunt, sent me copies of two documents that I had faxed from my office, but which had arrived at Mr Hunt’s office as blank sheets of paper except for this strange numbering system, again inside a small square in the top right corner of the page. Mr Hunt also sent a copy of his fax journal for that day (see Hacking – Julian Assange File No /48 and File No/49) confirming their arrival in his office, just as AUSTEL had also done, just one day into my arbitration.
In March 1994, Graham Schorer (COT spokesperson) and another COT member suffered break-ins and lost business-related documents. That made us all much more vigilant. I found no evidence of a break-in, but I did notice two diaries covering the period 1987 to 1989 were missing. I decided to remove my official business diaries from my office, and from that time on, I transferred information to them on a weekly basis from my wall calendar and unofficial notebooks.
The following statements are taken from Graham Schorer’s Statutory Declaration re his break-in. (See Hacking – Julian Assange File No/3)
“In early February 1994, our premises were broken into and all computer cables including the power cables were severed, as well as all power connections to the main server which was in a specially constructed room. The perpetrators forced entry into the building in what the police described as a “ram raid”, where something similar to pneumatic tyre attached to the front of a vehicle was used to hit the front door with enough force to dislodge the steel frame attached to the brick work.
Part of the microfiche copier and viewer was stolen, as well as the PC on my desk which contained all of my COT information and correspondence between regulators, politicians, etc. Also stolen was a book that contained a catalogue of computer file numbers against their description.
The same day I spoke to Garry Dawson from Dawson Weed and Pest Control (another COT Case) on the phone, who told me that his business premises in Sunshine had been broken into just after midnight and burgled. The only thing stolen was the Dictaphone tape which held a recording he had made of a meeting between him and two Telstra executives on the previous day”. (see also Arbitrator File No/84)
Two months after the above break-in, my arbitration claim adviser Garry Ellicott (ex-National Crime Investigator and ex-Detective Sergeant of the Queensland Police) visited and we spent five nights trying to decipher the pile of Telstra discovery documents. It was then that I discovered further losses: exercise books in which I kept official booking records; a number of bank statements and my bank pay-in books for 1992/93. I cannot account for these losses. It is possible they were also missing in March, and I simply didn’t notice their absence. Without these records, I was hard-pressed to produce full and correct financial statements for my forensic accountant, Derek Ryan, and was reduced to scavenging information from wall calendars and other unofficial sources. When Garry returned to Queensland, I got him to take the work diaries with him for safe-keeping.
In February 1994, Detective Superintendent Jeff Penrose and Constable Melanie Cochrane of the AFP visited my business to discuss my concerns regarding the possibility my telephone conversations were intercepted and my faxes were not being received at the intended destination. During this visit, I spoke to Constable Cochrane regarding my concerns about the privacy issues connected to my singles club records, explaining I had provided the club members with a written assurance that I would not circulate their private information to anyone without first seeking their permission. For this reason, I was particularly concerned that it would not be fair to submit any of their private information into my Fast Track Settlement Proposal. Constable Cochrane commented that the TIO should contemplate suspending our settlement process until after the AFP finished their investigations into Telstra’s unauthorised interception of COT cases’ telephone conversations and in-confidence faxes.
The letter dated 2 March 1994, from Telstra’s Corporate Solicitor, Ian Row, to Detective Superintendent Jeff Penrose (see Home Page Part-One File No/9-A to 9-C), makes it quite clear that Mr Penrose was profoundly misled and deceived about the faxing problems I was having to deal with, as discussed in this letter. Over the years, many people have compared the four exhibits numbered (File No/9-C) with the interception evidence revealed in Open Letter File No/12, and File No/13 and promptly concluded that, if Ian Row had not misled the AFP in relation to my faxing issues then the AFP may have been able to stop Telstra from intercepting the various relevant AFP arbitration documents in March 1994, before any damage had been done
This letter dated 14 April 1994, from Telstra’s Steve Black to Detective Superintendent Jeff Penrose states that Telstra only voice-monitored my telephone service from June to August 1993. This corresponds to Steve Black’s statement in a letter to Warwick Smith, which is recorded below, are various pages from a transcript of an AFP interview with me on 29 September 1994, which records the police asking me about a hand-written reference to a bus company that Telstra appeared to have added in the top right corner of a letter I had written previously, on 10th September 1992, to Telstra, when that name was not mentioned in that letter. It is true that I was tendering to a number of bus companies during 1992, including Nuline Bus Services, Centre Road, Bentleigh, Mooney Valley Bus Lines, Money Valley, Warrnambool Bus Lines and O’Meara’s (the name that had been hand-written in the corner of this letter). I had contacted all four companies for the same tender in an attempt to use one of their services to bring people from Melbourne to Cape Bridgewater, but since O’Meara’s was not mentioned anywhere in the letter it had been added to, it would seem that Telstra was actually voice monitoring my phone calls or intercepting his faxes as early as September 1992.
On 26 September 1994, Detective Superintendent Penrose again visited my business with a still-serving officer of the AFP (hence I will not name that officer) for a second interview regarding the same matter. By then I had told the AFP about threats I received from Telstra executives, who were refusing to supply any further FOI documents to help me in my arbitration because they knew I was assisting the AFP with their investigations. Senate Hansard records, dated 29 November 1994
Screening In-Confidence Faxes
The Australian Government has since been provided with a report confirming that confidential, arbitration-related documents were secretly and illegally screened before they arrived at their intended destination. It has now been confirmed some never arrived at all.
One of those documents, dated 18 April 1995, and which appears to have been secretly screened and withheld from the claimants and only provided to them seven years after the arbitrations concluded, is discussed in Arbitrator / Part Two Chapter Eight. This three-page letter from the arbitration project manager to Warwick Smith (arbitration administrator) and copied to Dr Hughes (the arbitrator) advised:
“It is unfortunate that there have been forces at work collectively beyond our reasonable control that have delayed us in undertaking our work.” (See Call For Justice DCITA File No 9).
The four COT claimants were never told about these forces at work nor were we warned that, under the noses of the TIO, his legal advisor and the arbitrator, these un-named forces were allowed to infiltrate and manipulate the arbitration process. When these three legal experts, namely Dr Gordon Hughes, Warwick Smith and Peter Bartlett, allowed this very important 18 April 1995 letter to be concealed from the four COT cases, they directly assisted those “forces at work” to carry out their intended disruption of the four COT cases’ arbitrations.
Note: the not credible arbitration agreement discussed by Dr Gordon Hughes in his 12 May 1995 letter to Warwick Smith (see Open Letter File No 55-A) was covertly drafted by Telstra (the defendant) and then was used as the final version of the agreement for the first four arbitrations, instead of the independently crafted agreement that was formally agreed to by all parties and various members of government. This Telstra-designed agreement provided numerous benefits for the defence, such as not enough time allowed for inevitable delays associated with the production of documents, obtaining further particulars and the preparation of technical reports;
How can the Australian government engage in a negotiation with the arbitrator, the administrator and the defendant, Telstra Corporation, and allow that corporation – who is also under investigation by the Australian Federal Police for committing crimes against the claimants – to write up its own agreement under which it is to be investigated under by the same arbitrator (who advised the claimants and the government that he drafted the agreement)?
On 12 May 1995, 13 months into my arbitration and one day after he brought down my award, Dr Hughes condemned the Telstra-drafted arbitration agreement as not a credible document to use in the process; however, he used it to my detriment as a claimant and stated:
“…as far as I could observe, both Telecom and Smith co-operated in the Smith arbitration;
“the time frames set in the original Arbitration Agreement were, with the benefit of hindsight, optimistic;
“in particular; we did not allow sufficient time in the Arbitration Agreement for inevitable delays associated with the production of documents, obtaining further particulars and the preparation of technical reports; …
“In summary, it is my view that if the process is to remain credible, it is necessary to contemplate a time frame for completion which is longer than presently contained in the Arbitration Agreement.”
The fax imprint across the top of this letter (Open Letter File No 55-A) is the same as the fax imprint described in the Scandrett & Associates report (see Open Letter File No/12 and File No/13), confirming faxes were intercepted during the COT arbitrations. The question the Telecommunication Industry Ombudsman (TIO) and the Federal Attorney-General has still not answered is:
Was this letter actually faxed to my office by the TIO. to assist me in any pending appeal process and, if not, why was such an important letter deliberately kept from me during my designated appeal period?
If I had received a copy of this letter, declaring the agreement used in my arbitration process was not credible, then of course, I would have appealed the arbitrator’s award. After all, how could an appeal judge argue against the arbitrator’s own findings that the agreement was not credible, even though he used it anyway?
How could Dr Hughes even contemplate making a statement like: “…as far as I could observe, both Telecom and Smith co-operated in the Smith arbitration”, let alone decide to include it in his 12 May letter, when he and the Senate had already been warned that Telstra was threatening to withhold further relevant documents from me, simply because I had agreed to assist the Australian Federal Police with their investigations into Telstra’s unauthorized interception of my phone conversations and faxes and, even worse than that level of Telstra treachery, Telstra then actually carried out those threats? And what about the advice that both the arbitrator and Warwick Smith had received on 18 April 1995 (see above), which stated clearly that there had been ‘forces at work’ that had ‘derailed’ my arbitration? This 12 May statement shows that Dr Hughes was quite clearly choosing to protect those ‘forces at work’, regardless of the serious problems that created for me.
Interception of this 12 May 1995 letter by a secondary fax machine:
Whoever had access to Telstra’s network, and therefore the TIO’s office service lines, knew – during the designated appeal time of my arbitration – that my arbitration was conducted using a set of rules (arbitration agreement) that the arbitrator declared not credible. There are three fax identification lines across the top of the second page of this 12 May 1995 letter:
- The third line down from the top of the page (i.e. the bottom line) shows that the document was first faxed from the arbitrator’s office, on 12-5-95, at 2:41 pm to the Melbourne office of the TIO – 61 3 277 8797;
- The middle line indicates that it was faxed on the same day, one hour later, at 15:40, from the TIO’s fax number, followed by the words “TIO LTD”.
- The top line, however, begins with the words “Fax from” followed by the correct fax number for the TIO’s office (visible
Consider the order of the time stamps. The top line is the second sending of the document at 14:50, nine minutes after the fax from the arbitrator’s office; therefore, between the TIO’s office receiving the first fax, which was sent at 2.41 pm (14:41), and sending it on at 15:40, to his home, the fax was also re-sent at 14:50. In other words, the document sent nine minutes after the letter reached the TIO office was intercepted.
“We canvassed examples, which we are advised are a representative group, of this phenomena [sic].
“They show that
- the header strip of various faxes is being altered
- the header strip of various faxes was changed or semi overwritten.
- In all cases the replacement header type is the same.
- The sending parties all have a common interest and that is COT.
- Some faxes have originated from organisations such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman office.
- The modified type face of the header could not have been generated by the large number of machines canvassed, making it foreign to any of the sending services.”
One of the two technical consultants attesting to the validity of this fax interception report emailed me on 17 December 2014, stating:
“I still stand by my statutory declaration that I was able to identify that the incoming faxes provided to me for review had at some stage been received by a secondary fax machine and then retransmitted, this was done by identifying the dual time stamps on the faxes provided.” (Front Page Part One File No/14)
It is also clear from Front Page Part One File No/1, File No/2-A to 2-E, File No/3, File No/4 and Front Page Part One File No/5, that numerous documents faxed from my office to the arbitrators office did not reach their intended destination.
Many within the Establishment said that it was actually unconstitutional to force the COT cases into an arbitration process with Telstra while the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were still investigating Telstra for alleged phone and fax hacking of the COT cases’ businesses and, furthermore, it was acknowledged that it was clearly an unworkable process. This didn’t stop the arbitrations, however, although it does raise a number of important questions:
- How could two separate investigations into Telstra, for allegedly unlawful conduct, be undertaken by two different organisations at the same time, i.e., an arbitrator as well as the AFP? As far as we can find, this situation is unheard of in any other Western democracy.
- While all the COT cases attempted to keep their individual small businesses going while their arbitrations continued, how could we be expected to submit complex submissions to an arbitrator and, at the same time, assist the AFP with their investigations?
- Who decided that this situation would be allowed to continue?
(see Senate Evidence File No 1), record this fact.
When I reminded Detective Superintendent Penrose about my previous concerns regarding the privacy issues of females who joined my singles club weekends at Cape Bridgewater, I explained I had uncovered a document, showing Telstra recorded the names and phone numbers of two of my singles club female members. When this was added to other documents I supplied to the AFP, it was clear I could not submit any of my singles club information in my arbitration without some security measures being applied by the arbitrator.
Mr Penrose then suggested that I submit a letter to the arbitrator, explaining that the AFP was investigating matters associated with these privacy issues and my arbitration, and ask if I could submit my Singles Club information directly to the arbitrator, under confidentiality, and as a separate arbitration issue, because it would not be considered appropriate for me to release this private material into a process where others could have easy access because that would raise serious concerns: also suggested that the arbitrator would be well aware of the need to keep this information ‘under wraps’ so to speak.
Well, I did exactly what Superintendent Detective Jeff Penrose suggested and that the arbitrator responded some days later informing me that he would accept this part of my submission at a proposed oral arbitration hearing on 11 October 1994.
Constable Melanie Cochrane stated I should not release the singles club members’ private information to Telstra and Superintendent Detective Penrose suggested I provide the private singles club information to the assessor under confidentiality and advise him the AFP was also investigating this same material that appears to have been hacked by Telstra.
Constable Cochrane also stated that as I had assured my singles club members their private information would not be disclosed without their consent, I also needed to discuss this with the assessor, Dr Hughes. I believe Superintendent Detective Penrose stated the assessor would be aware I could not divulge this private information via mainstream documents with Telstra, while the AFP was investigating.
It was due to these types of facts, and Superintendent Detective Penrose’s advice, that I sought a clearance, from the arbitrator, to allow me to have this information accepted under confidentiality
Transcripts from my 11 October 1994 oral arbitration hearing confirm Telstra advised the arbitrator they thought my singles club information was irrelevant and therefore should not be accepted into the arbitration process. This evidence supported that I had lost two businesses due to my ongoing telephone problems, i.e., the school camp bookings as well as the more-lucrative singles club bookings. The transcripts, which I can supply the AFP if requested, show Dr Hughes was badgered into accepting Telstra’s insistence that my singles club material be not assessed during the arbitration process. Why did Dr Hughes allow Telstra to decide not to view my singles club evidence as a business loss, even though he had previously understood the advice given to me by Superintendent Detective Penrose and had agreed the singles club material could be submitted under confidentiality during the oral hearing? That he went back on his word.
Question 24, in the 20 September 1994 interrogatories shows I answered the following question 24 by stating to Telstra and the arbitrator:
“This matter is currently under investigation by the Federal Police. In the interest of fair justice I believe that I should not further comment apart from what I have already stated that it is true that I was told this by Detective Superintendent Penrose. It the Australian Federal Police are prepared to disclose the details of their investigations and of their conversations with myself, then Telecom will be able to obtain the same”
In our Front Page) for the date of 11 October 1994, during my five-hour, nonstop, oral-arbitration hearing, Telstra’s Mr Benjamin and Telstra’s other arbitration liaison officer, Steve Black, discussed along with the arbitrator and me my claims regarding Telstra’s unauthorized interception issues noting:
Mr Benjamin: “In respect of Detective Superintendent Penrose.”
Mr Black:“There has been an allegation that Detective Superintendent Penrose says that the Plummers’ telephone was allegedly unlawfully tapped” —
Me: “I believe Telecom is playing on words – the word “illegally tapped” – it’s like asking me – I’m not a —
Dr Hughes: “Sorry, if I can interrupt both of you, the issue here is that your answers – your answer to question 24, you indicate that you were told something by Detective Superintendent Penrose.”
Dr Hughes: “Is there any documentation to support that statement or is there any other light that you can shed upon that statement you have made in relation to Detective Penrose?”…
Me: “I have spoken to Detective Penrose on two occasions and he has stated that my phones had been listened to.”
I raise the interrogatories and the oral arbitration hearing because of the main question they raise: how could it possibly be ethical, or moral, for Dr Hughes to expect me to disclose further personal and private information about the female members of my Singles Club, for all to see, when the AFP were still investigating Telstra in relation to how they were able to separately record the names and phone numbers of various other female Singles Club members when that information had only ever been sent by fax or discussed over the telephone. NONE of my singles club lost revenue due to my ongoing proven telephone faults were ever recorded by Dr Hughes (arbitrator) or Ferrier Hodgson Corporate Advisory (arbitration resource unit) in their final Cape Bridgewater Holiday Camp findings.
Page 180 ERC&A, from the official Australian Senate Hansard, dated 29 November 1994, reports Senator Ron Boswell asking Telstra’s legal directorate:
“Why did Telecom advise the Commonwealth Ombudsman that Telecom withheld FOI documents from Alan Smith because Alan Smith provided Telecom FOI documents to the Australian Federal Police during their investigation?”
After receiving a hollow response from Telstra, which the senator, the AFP and I all knew was utterly false, the senator states:
“…Why would Telecom withhold vital documents from the AFP? Also, why would Telecom penalise COT members for providing documents to the AFP which substantiate that Telecom had conducted unauthorised interceptions of COT members’ communications and subsequently dealt in the intercepted information by providing that information to Telecom’s external legal advisers and others?” (See Senate Evidence File No 31)
Thus, the threats became a reality. What is so appalling about the withholding of relevant documents is that no one in the TIO office or government has ever investigated the disastrous impact this had on my overall submission to the arbitrator. The arbitrator and the government (who at the time fully owned Telstra) should have initiated an investigation into why an Australian citizen, who assisted the AFP in their investigations into unlawful interception of telephone conversations, was so severely disadvantaged during a civil arbitration Page Part One File No/14)
NONE of the COT Cases were ever on a terrorist list in 1994 (or since, for that matter) and nor were any of us ever listed as suspects in relation to any crimes committed against any Australian citizens. This means that we must therefore ask: why were these innocent claimants’ in-confidence arbitration and Telstra-related documents hacked by Telstra while Telstra was defending the various COT cases arbitrations? In my own case, 42 separate sets of correspondence faxed to the Arbitrator’s office (some with attachments) are not listed on the Arbitration Schedules of Material received by the Arbitration process. It is clear from Front Page Part One File No/1 that even though the Arbitrator’s secretary advised Tony Watson (part of Telstra’s Arbitration Defence Unit) that on 23 May 1994, six of my claim documents were never received at the Arbitrator’s fax machine. It is clear from my Telstra account I was charged for those six faxes as having left my office, yet no one from the Arbitrator’s office nor the TIO’s office when this matter was exposed, allowed me to amend my claim so that these proven “non received” claim documents were valued by the Arbitrator in support of my claim.
During the infamous UK phone-hacking scandal (see opposite), the Daily Mirror printed an apology in that newspaper, admitting that “such behaviour represented an unwarranted and unacceptable intrusion into people’s private lives”. Why hasn’t the Australian government compensated the COT Cases who clear proof that: an unwarranted and unacceptable intrusion into their private and business lives during their arbitrations ruined any chance they had of having a proper assessment of their arbitration claims i.e. an arbitration process originally endorsed by the government?
The COT cases should never have been forced into arbitration while the AFP was investigating Telstra for unauthorised phone and fax hacking issues. Evidence showing in-confidence COT cases privileged client to lawyer and arbitration procedural documentation was hacked into during the COT arbitrations.
Telstra clearly achieved their objective, which was to ensure that NONE of the intercepted singles club material that Telstra employees intercepted went before Dr Hughes (the arbitrator) for assessment. Had the arbitrator’s technical resource unit viewed, as part of their evaluation process, the 26 September 1994 transcripts, prepared by the AFP and showing the AFP indeed uncovered evidence showing Telstra was intercepting my telephone conversations without my authorisation, they would have seen the AFP findings proved my claim was correct (See Front Page Part Two File No/2). Had the arbitrator allowed the consultants to address my singles club loss of business they would have uncovered the fax interception. With this evidence, alone, Dr Hughes would have had to make an award against Telstra concerning these matters. He also would have to accept my singles club members’ privacy was also violated, as well as my own. Viewing this evidence, which the AFP uncovered, meant that he would have to accept that I was indeed running two businesses and that Ferrier Hodgson Corporate Advisory was grossly negligent in their reporting by ignoring 47 per cent of my clientele, i.e., the singles club members. My revenue loss, from the much-higher tariff of those patrons, should have been included in their final report.
When Telstra stopped me from submitting that singles club material as part of my claim, on 11 October 1994, it had a dual domino effect on my overall losses: Telstra did not have to address the evidence of intercepting my telephone conversation. Telstra minimised their liability by not having to pay out the losses of the revenue I lost due to singles club patrons being unable to contact my venue at will. Telstra did not have to answer to the arbitrator why they were intercepting faxes during the arbitration process. Open Letter File No/12, and File No/13 show arbitration documents were intercepted during the COT arbitrations.
There should have been NO arbitration until the Australian Federal Police (AFP) completed its findings. No other Western nation allows two legal processes to run at the same time (i.e., the AFP investigation as well as arbitration) as one impedes upon the other. This is exactly what happened. It was unconstitutional to force a citizen into this type of no-win situation. Even worse, if that is at all possible, once I began to assist the AFP in their interception investigations Telstra stopped supplying my requested FOI documents.
Chapter Six – Helen Handbury
In 1999, while I was working on the draft of Absentjustice my story, I provided it to Rupert Murdoch’s sister, Helen Handbury. She was aghast at the blatant denial of natural justice that I had received. Helen twice visited my holiday camp and, after reading the draft, stated that she would have Rupert publish it. She believed he would be shocked.
Helen was astounded when she discovered just how much evidence I had accumulated over the years, partly because it proved just how long ago both the illegal fax hacking and the discrimination had started, serious discrimination that was handed out by those who had administered my arbitration process. She said that she had been really upset to even contemplate how much suffering and stress had been piled on to the members of COT, just because we persisted with our battle to get a reliable phone service, not just for ourselves, but also for other phone-dependent businesses in South West Victoria. After reading the many supporting letters I had received from The Hon David Hawker MP, when he was our local Member of Parliament, and seeing that those letters also showed quite clearly that many individuals from the towns around Hamilton (which was not far from where Helen and her husband ran their farm) had also written to Mr Hawker about the phone problems they were suffering, and that he had passed those letters on to me, so I could take them with me, to Parliament House, in Canberra. It was then that Helen asked if she could read my book, particularly when I told her that the manuscript included actual proof of how someone with access to Telstra’s network had severely disrupted the fax process of numerous claim documents that I had attempted to fax to the arbitrator during my arbitration.
Helen was clearly shocked and believed her brother would likewise if he saw for himself Open Letter File No/12, and File No/13 which clearly shows arbitration related faxes had been intercepted by a secondary facsimile machine before being redirected onto their original intended destination.
Of course, 1999 was before the hacking scandal linked to the News of the World.
Unfortunately, Helen died in 2004. Some years later, on 26 September 2012, I sent a draft of the original version of Ring for Justice to her husband, Geoff Handbury, and told him about my conversation with Helen. I asked whether he could suggest the best way for me to get a copy of the book to Rupert Murdoch.
Mr Handbury replied on 17 October 2012 in a handwritten letter (with beautiful, old-fashioned penmanship that we no longer see). However, he was then 87 years old and although highly respected for his philanthropic support of many worthwhile projects in Victoria, too much time had passed and, sadly, he wasn’t able to help. Still, I have the memory of how the sister of the biggest newspaper-owner in the world believed my “intriguing story” was certainly one that her brother should publish and I’m grateful for her comments.
Ironically, on 13 October 1993, a Telstra auditor visited Cape Bridgewater with his secretary. By 2015, the auditor had become a very senior executive within Telstra and he is now on the board of Murdoch’s Foxtel. I am sure he remembers how shocked he and his secretary were when they saw the information I presented to them in relation to my Telstra problems; they both commented that they could not believe how badly Telstra treated me for the previous five years. That five-year period was confirmed in a 9 June 1993 letter from AUSTEL (see Arbitrator File No 61); this letter and its suggestion that Telstra knowingly misled and deceived me during my first settlement in December 1992 shocked them the most.
The British Government pulled no punches in relation to the ongoing saga now, six years after it first went viral across the world. But in Australia, although the government knows that not only did many COT members have their phone lines illegally bugged during their arbitration with Telstra (and, after my arbitration was over), but our faxes were ALSO being screened/intercepted by a secondary fax machine (in my case, for at least seven years after my arbitration was concluded.
In Australia, the COTs have suffered too, just like those victims of the News of the World disaster in Britain; for instance, we couldn’t make a phone call or send a personal fax without being aware that somebody was probably listening in to those calls or intercepting those faxes., Scandrett and Associates’ prepared the Fax Interception Technical Report exhibit (see Open Letter File No/12, and File No/13 and Peter Hancock of Total Communications Victoria provided a sworn statement as to the validity that report. HOWEVER, Senator Boswell never contacted me regarding any outcome of the Senate estimate’s investigation or any other government investigation into this report, which is easily comparable to the News of the World hacking scandal.
I have not been contacted by the Federal government concerning this fax hacking/interception issue but, if such hacking had taken place in the halls of Britain’s parliament it would have been even bigger than the News of the World Rupert Murdoch’s hacking fiasco that led to the 2011 shutting down of that newspaper, first circulated in 1847.
Chapter Seven – George Close
George Close, the technical consultant for the COT cases, visited my residence in Cape Bridgewater after I showed him Open Letter File No/12, File No/13, Front Page Part One File No/1, Front Page Part One File No/2-A to 2-E, Front Page Part One File No/4 and Front Page Part One File No/5. We discussed the effect of these intercepted/hacked faxes on my overall submission to the arbitrator. Mr Close later sent me an email, on 5 August 2011, to assist me with breaking open this terrible denial of justice to the COT cases (see Front Page Part One File No/26).
Senator Ron Boswell gave me valuable support during my arbitration and he attempted to find out why Telstra was allowed to threaten me and why, when those threats became a reality, no one from the arbitration process, including Warwick Smith (the administrator of my arbitration) and Dr Hughes (the so-called arbitrator) did anything. It was because of Senator Ron Boswell’s decent nature that George emailed the following statement:
“I recall a discussion with Senator Ron Boswell during the late 90’s.
“He had been shown fax’s [sic] which had clear indication of change in the headers, indicating interruption in transmission by a third party or parties.
“He questioned whether it was possible that faxes to and from senators could be interrupted, read or copies.
“My response in the affirmative brought about an expression of extreme anger. Stating that if it could be proven that it occurred the offender(s) would be jailed.
“If required I am prepared to re-state this on an affidavit.”
So far, no one in Australia has even been brought to account, let alone jailed, for the terrible invasion of the COT cases’ private and business lives.
The phone-hacking scandal in the UK which I have discussed in the Hacking- Julian Assange link, and the criminal charges laid against various former employees of the Murdoch-owned News of the World newspaper were, in fact, themselves now ‘News of the World’ and it had been shown that this hacking had been an ongoing secret since at least 2005. So why did it take six years to explode into world news? Our Main Evidence File No/7 and 8 and the unedited version of my Chronology of Events which I provided to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in September, 2014 and an accompanying CD, show that the phone and fax lines of various COT claimants have been subjected to hacking since at least since 1993 and although I have been able to prove that, in my case at least, the service lines to both my private residence and my business, both lines, have been subjected to hacking up to at least 2002, and yet no-one will investigate this hacking and no-one will investigate the mail that both my partner Cathy and I proved at the time went ‘astray’ without explanation, even though I was first alerted to my Telstra-related mail being lost as far back as 1994 and, as Chapters forty-nine and sixty-three show in my unedited Chronology of Events, mail associated with my 1994 arbitration was still being lost or tampered with at least up to December 2008, more than fourteen years after this hacking/interception issues were supposed to have been addressed as part of my arbitration.
Exhibit AS 492-A file AS-CAV 488-A to 494-E is a letter dated 26 August 1998 from George Close (my previous arbitration technical consultant to the new Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman. The fax header records: Fax from: — 61 74 453198 — 17:54 which was Mr Close’s residential fax number. Our Main Evidence File (see Open Letter File No/12, and File No/13), is the technical findings of both Scandrett & Associates and Peter Hancock showing that they both agree that, if the wording Fax from: followed by the numbers of the various COT faxes does not also include the correct business identification of the respective COT business then that indicates that those faxes were intercepted by a secondary fax machine and then redirected on to the intended destination.
This intercepted letter from Mr Close was copied to the offices of twelve different Government Ministers in Parliament House Canberra, which then raises a number of very important questions. Since we constantly hear about politicians questioning how information has been leaked from the party room, could this be because even Government offices in Parliament House are also routed through Telstra’s Fax Streaming centre? Even if the Fax Streaming arrangement has been officially organised by those Government offices, what could be happening to the documents that go through that system, without the Government’s knowledge? Could it be that privileged, in-confidence material ‘leaks’ out of Parliament house through Telstra in this same way? Could it be that Telstra’s Fax Streaming process means that, around the country, private is not so private at all?
PLEASE NOTE: although the George Close exhibits are of poor quality (having been copied a number of times) the poor quality does not take away the truth that these exhibits when viewed together still prove our claims.
Exhibit AS 492-B file AS-CAV 488-A to 494-E, which is a report faxed by Mr Close on 16 April 1998, has the correct identification across the top of the page see: 61-74-453198 — GEORGE CLOSE & ASSOC — 17:34. In simple terms, those with access to Telstra’s network were able to use ‘keywords’ so only certain faxes leaving Mr Close’s residence were intercepted. I have used these two examples because they were both sent at approximately the same time in the afternoon, although months apart.
My fax identification on the first fax dated 8th May 2001, to Ms Kirsten Musgrove FOI Coordinator Australian Communications Authority (ACA) and two-page accompanying letter see exhibit AS 514 file AS-CAV 495 to 541 reads: 18-5-2001 – 11:33 – FROM CAPE BRIDGE HDAY CAMP to 0262195499 P.01, is my correct fax identification. The fax identification on the copy of my letter dated 4th July 2001, to Tony Shaw, Chairman of the ACA after it had been faxed to Mr Shaw’s Canberra office exhibit AS 515 file AS-CAV 495 to 541 on 5th July 2001, reads: Fax from: 055 267 230 – 05/07/01 – 04:41, is incorrect because the FROM CAPE BRIDGE HDAY CAMP identification has been removed;
My telephone/fax account exhibit AS 516 file AS-CAV 495 to 541 lists Exhibit (AS 515) as having transmitted successfully to Tony Shaw’s Canberra office, 0262195200 at 04:42am. The 4:44 minute transmission time shown on (AS 516), confirms (AS 515) were faxed from my private residence 03 55 267265.
Who within the Telstra Corporation has the authorisation to intercept faxes leaving my private residence (seven years after my arbitration)?
Exhibits AS 494-C, AS 494-D and AS 494-E clearly show that Telstra technicians experienced major problems when they attempted to test my fax machine in conjunction with a fax machine installed at Graham Schorer’s (COT spokesperson’s) office. It is important to highlight Exhibit AS 494-A because according to the arbitration agreement, all of my claim documents should have automatically been returned to me within six weeks after the arbitrator had handed down his findings. When this didn’t happen, I arranged to collect the documents myself and then drove to Melbourne to pick them up. When I got back to Cape Bridgewater I discovered that more than half of my original faxed claim documents were missing from the arbitrators official arbitration received schedule documents.
A comparison of Telstra’s official schedule of documents received with the dated fax accounts and the letters and documents that I had been faxing to the arbitrator during the whole duration of my arbitration has been documented in Exhibit (AS 789). This Exhibit shows there were some forty-one sets of documents that although they were faxed to the arbitrator’s office those documents were not forwarded on to Telstra’s defence.
The hand-written note in the top left corner of AS 494-C states: “Stored in Fax Stream”, confirming that faxes intercepted via Telstra’s testing process are stored in Telstra’s Fax Stream centre so the document can be read, at any time, by anyone with access to that centre. In other words, this storage system shows other types of documents (not just test faxes) can be intercepted in the same way and then stored in Telstra’s fax Stream centre so the document can be read, at any time by anyone with access to that centre.
The Scandrett & Associates report ( )proves that numerous COT arbitration documents were definitely intercepted, including faxes travelling to and from Parliament House, the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office and various COT cases premises, including Alan’s business. (AS 494-C) also shows that intercepted faxes were, perhaps still are, stored wherever it is that Telstra’s fax stream documents were/are stored. This means, in turn, that Telstra, the defendant in the COT arbitrations, had free access to in-confidence documents that the claimants believed they were only sending to their accountants, lawyers and/or technical advisors that the claimants might not have wanted disclosed to the defendants at the time.
If the Senate Estimates Committee had been provided with this evidence COT faxes were stored in a facility for assessment purposes, together with the George Close/Fax Stream interception evidence (AS 492-A above), all of the COT arbitrations would have been considered null and void and Telstra would have been ordered to compensate all of the COT Cases for all of their costs, both up to that time and while a new arbitration process was being set up to ensure the COT Cases received their discovery documents. This screening of COT Cases arbitration documents by someone with access to Telstra’s network has also been discussed in various chapter on absentjustice.com forty and whether the Australian Government should have investigated this privacy under Article 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights when they were first raised during the various COT Cases arbitrations.
As recently as March 2018, compensation was being paid out in Britain to the victims of this hacking scandal see www.
guardian.com/media/2017/apr/25/mirror-group-settles-phone-hacking-claims-with-undisclosed-damages). All of those victims are entitled to compensation because their lives will never be the same again. The uneasy feeling whenever they pick up the phone as they wonder ‘Is someone else listening in?’, ‘Does someone else now know that I am going away for the weekend?’ Those memories for those British victims will never go away. I know.
The matters discussed on absentjustice.com are said in the public interest and therefore are made in accordance with the Victorian Defamation Act 2005 Defamation-division 1 Defamation and the general law see > www.legislation.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web-Note.
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